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ABSTRACT 
Police generally do not need a warrant to search information that we reveal to third parties.  This so-called “third-
party doctrine” is supposed to tell courts when our personal information is no longer private, and therefore not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.  In the modern world, the doctrine goes too far, leaving much of our most 
intimate information exposed.  We have little choice but to trust third-parties like cell companies, internet service 
providers, email providers, and the like with most of the data we generate. 
The root of the problem is the Supreme Court’s restrictive conception of privacy.  As the third-party doctrine shows, 
the Court inherently understands privacy to be a type of secrecy.  Just as information is no longer secret when told, 
the Court thinks that information is no longer private after it is shared.  The narrow exception recently recognized 
in Carpenter v. United States does little to change this.  In response, scholars have tried to invent entirely new 
conceptions of privacy or have proposed overruling the third-party doctrine altogether.   
There is no need for such drastic and unlikely measures.  Anglo-American law already has a suitable alternate 
understanding of privacy, refined over a four-hundred-year tradition, that is up to the task.  Long before privacy 
was important to constitutional law, it was one of the central concepts for the common law of attorney-client 
privilege.  Importantly, the privilege takes privacy to be a kind of confidentiality, rather than secrecy.  Confidences, 
unlike secrets, can be shared.  As a result, attorney-client communications can remain privileged even after 
voluntary disclosure to third parties if appropriate steps were taken to preserve their confidentiality.  Conceiving of 
privacy as a kind of confidentiality could help soften the bright-line of the third-party doctrine by recognizing when 
the presence of third parties like cell companies or email providers truly removes privacy interests, and, as 
importantly, when it does not.  Without such a development, the third-party doctrine will not survive the 
Information Age—or our Fourth Amendment protections will not survive it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If you have me, you want to share me.  If you share me, you haven’t got me.  What 
am I? 
—Old Riddle1  
 We generate at least two-and-a-half quintillion bytes of data every day.2  
Common sense dictates that much of this information—private photos, 
personal documents, geolocation records, communications with friends and 
family, etc.—is just the sort of thing that the Fourth Amendment should 
presumptively protect.3  It does not.  Because most of this information passes 
through wires, servers, and satellites that others own, it is beyond the reach 
of the Fourth Amendment.4  The need to protect this information from those 
with the power to punish was one of the crucial insights of the warrant 
requirement.5  When authorities have ready access to our private 
information, we lose the open-ended freedom to develop and explore the 
diverse personal identities that are the cornerstone of American 
individualism and progress.6  
 
 1  See, e.g., Ivan Dimitrijevic, Answer These Riddles and You Will Find the Answers to Life, LIFEHACK, 
https://www.lifehack.org/articles/communication/answer-these-riddles-and-you-will-find-the-
answers-life.html. 
 2 Matthew Wall, Big Data: Are You Ready for Blast-Off?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26383058.  This number is almost three years old now; it is 
surely much higher today. 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
 4 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  
 5 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (“[T]he [Fourth] Amendment seeks 
to secure the ‘privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 630 (1886)); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (explaining that the purpose 
of the warrant requirement is to limit invasions of privacy by law enforcement). 
 6 ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & DAVID LYON, LIQUID SURVEILLANCE: A CONVERSATION 28 (2013) 
(“[P]rivacy being the realm that is meant to be one’s own domain, the territory of one’s undivided 
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 Not for the first time, Supreme Court doctrine developed at an earlier 
stage of human technology is bungling things today.  In the nineteenth 
century, Fourth Amendment doctrine centered on preventing unwarranted 
physical intrusions by the government.7  With the advent of wired 
telecommunications in the twentieth century, the physical intrusion test 
regretfully led the Court to bless forty years of unwarranted police wiretaps8 
before changing its approach.9    
 In the present day, the doctrinal holdover is the third-party doctrine.  
The current touchstone of Fourth Amendment protection is sensible enough; 
it safeguards citizens’ “reasonable expectation[s] of privacy.”10  The 
qualification added by the third-party doctrine may itself have made sense 
when the Supreme Court announced it decades ago: “[A] person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to 
third parties.”11  Today, in the connected world of cellphones, tablets, and 
laptops, that information is almost all of it.  To make use of these devices, we 
have to trust everything passing to or from them to the third parties who 
transmit and store our data.12  Under the third-party doctrine, this means 
 
sovereignty, inside which one has the comprehensive and indivisible power to decide ‘what and 
who I am’ . . . . ”). 
 7 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974) 
(discussing that, traditionally, “searches” included physical entries and intrusions, but did not 
include observations without physical intrusion).   
 8 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).  Justices in the dissent saw the danger of 
the approach.  Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The progress of science in furnishing the 
Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.  Ways may some day 
be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can 
reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate 
occurrences of the home. . . .  Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such 
invasions of individual security?”). 
 9 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that governmental activities of wiretapping 
to listen to individual phone calls at a telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution). 
 10 Id.; City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 765 (2010) (holding that a city police officer’s employer 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment by reviewing the officer’s cell phone text messages because 
the officer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in sending the text messages); New York 
v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 117 (1986) (holding that police officers did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment by reaching into the defendant’s car to find a VIN number of his automobile because 
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in locating the VIN number). 
 11 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
 12 See DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 24–25 (2017) 
(discussing different ways that information is taken from unwitting technology users during the 
course of modern life); Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared 
Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211, 211–12 (2006) (discussing “pervasive, 
ubiquitous data collection” and storage in modern society). 
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that information has no Fourth Amendment protection.13 
 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States does little 
to change this.14  In Carpenter, the Court was asked whether police need a 
search warrant to access hundreds of days of “historical cell phone records 
that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.”15  
The Court left the third-party doctrine intact,16 but created a “narrow” 
exception for seven-day blocks of cell-site-derived geolocation data.17  All 
other sorts of data, even the same geolocation data in six-day blocks, are 
unaffected by the opinion.18   
 What is needed is a principled way of distinguishing between those cases 
where the third-party doctrine makes sense, and those where it does not.  
Sometimes it does make sense.  It is hard to maintain that the things someone 
says loudly to the person seated beside her on a crowded subway are still truly 
private.19  But there is an obvious difference when that someone is speaking 
in her own home, and the “third party” is a cell company’s algorithm logging 
the call.   
 Others have criticized the privacy gap in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence20 and proposed remedies.  Some have called for abandoning 
the third-party doctrine as anachronistic.21  That extreme solution risks 
abandoning the sensible results of the doctrine and unnecessarily hampering 
police investigations where no real privacy interests are at stake.22   
 
 13 See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46 (holding that phone records may not protected); United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (holding that bank records may not be protected); DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 93 
(2011) (“So does the Fourth Amendment protect you when the Government seeks your Google 
search records?  Not at all.”).  But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that compelling internet records that an internet provider produced without obtaining a 
warrant is a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 14 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 15 Id. at 2211–12. 
 16 Id. at 2220 (“We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller . . . .”). 
 17 Id.  
 18 Id. at 2220–21 (“We do not express a view on matters not before us . . . .   Nor do we address other 
business records that might incidentally reveal location information.”). 
 19 Lee Humphreys, Social Topography in a Wireless Era: The Negotiation of Public and Private Space, 35 J. 
TECHNICAL WRITING & COMM. 367, 367 (2005) (“Talking on the phone is usually a private 
activity, but it becomes a public activity when using a cellphone in certain spaces.”). 
 20 Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth 
Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 532 (2013) (discussing 
the “gaps” in the constitutional protection provided by the Fourth Amendment).  
 21 Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 142 (2014) (discussing that the third-
party doctrine’s role in the Fourth Amendment is “anachronistic to serve their purpose of 
distinguishing the borders of privacy protection.”). 
 22 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 600–01 (2009) 
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 A different sort of solution would call for reforming the doctrine from the 
inside out.  Perhaps a new theory of privacy could get judicial buy-in, and lead 
to a more sensible third-party doctrine based off it.23  As argued below, the 
Supreme Court’s hair-trigger conception of privacy as a kind of secrecy—lost 
when shared with someone else—is problematic.  A different understanding 
of privacy could generate a third-party doctrine with a more discriminating 
touch.  But before going to the lengths of inventing a new approach to privacy, 
we should consider whether there is not another solution, ready-made, and 
already a familiar fixture of Anglo-American legal traditions.  Not only would 
such a solution save a lot of effort, but the creatures of habit who run our 
courtrooms would likely be more receptive to it.  
 This Article approaches the problem by drawing on an area of law that 
privacy scholars have too long overlooked—attorney-client privilege.  
Embedded in attorney-client privilege jurisprudence is our longest-standing 
and richest privacy law tradition.  The attorney-client privilege is a common-
law protection for private communications between an attorney and her 
client.24  If protected by the privilege, courts cannot force the attorney or the 
client to turn over information, whether to other private parties or to the 
government.  The crucial element of the privilege is that the communications 
must be confidential.25  
 There is a version of the third-party doctrine at play in attorney-client 
privilege too—communications may lose their confidential nature if they are 
made in the presence of, or are subsequently disclosed to, third parties.  The 
important difference is that, depending on the context, there are steps 
attorneys and clients can take that will preserve the confidentiality of their 
communications.  As a general rule, with basic appropriate precautions, the 
attorney-client privilege protects information even after disclosure to third 
parties like email providers, cell companies, and internet service providers.   
 Courts applying privilege figured out decades ago what the Supreme 
Court still has not—how to treat information as private after it is shared with 
third-party service providers.  In the early rules and doctrines governing 
attorney-client confidences are the tools we need to adapt the Fourth 
 
(advancing that the third-party doctrine is important to maintain balance between police 
investigatory efforts and the privacy rights of citizens). 
 23 See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 8–9 (2012) (proposing one such theory). 
 24 FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 25 See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (John T. 
McNaughton rev., 1961) (noting requirement that attorney-client communications be “made in 
confidence” in order to be privileged). 
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Amendment and the third-party doctrine to the modern day.  The solution 
is practical and readily implemented, without grand shifts in fundamental 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence or revisionary theories of privacy. 
 In the lead-up to Carpenter, the Supreme Court seemed poised to 
recognize something like the secrecy/confidentiality distinction.  Individual 
members of the Court had signaled their discomfort with the third-party 
doctrine in separate opinions.26  Judge Stranch, who sat on the Sixth Circuit 
panel below, wrote a begrudging concurrence that asked the Supreme Court 
to “reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”27   
 The Carpenter Court nearly hit on a re-conception of the third-party 
doctrine.  It struggled for a vocabulary to describe situations in which “third 
parties [hold] records in which the suspect has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”28  Failing to find it, the Court tried a different tactic—an artificial 
carve-out for the “rare case[ ]” of seven-day blocks of cell-site location 
information—“an entirely different species of business record.”29  As Justice 
Kennedy argued in dissent, this distinction has the ad hoc feel of “an 
unprincipled and unworkable line between cell-site records on the one hand 
and financial and telephonic records on the other.”30 
 The language the Court needed was the language of confidentiality.  With 
that in hand, a solution to the third-party problem that does not rely on 
unsupportable distinctions between types of business records would have come 
into view.31  The Fourth Amendment does not protect some fore-ordained 
categories of “persons, houses, papers, and effects” over others.32  Rather, as 
the Supreme Court has recognized for the last half century, the Fourth 
Amendment protects information in which people have privacy interests.33  As 
argued below, modern technology is forcing us to distinguish between types of 
 
 26 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be 
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.  This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in 
which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of 
carrying out mundane tasks.” (internal citations omitted) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
742 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976))). 
 27 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 894 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 28 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018). 
 29 Id. at 2222. 
 30 Id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 31 Id. at 2220 (majority opinion) (“We do not express a view on matters not before us . . . .  Nor do we 
address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information.”). 
 32 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 33 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (introducing the reasonable expectations of 
privacy test). 
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privacy interests that were too easy to conflate not long ago.  The interests the 
Fourth Amendment should protect are confidentiality, not secrecy. 
 This Article explores what lessons the law of privilege, and in particular 
its understanding of privacy as a type of confidentiality, holds for Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  There are notions of voluntariness, disclosure, 
precaution, and fairness at play in the privilege context that have yet to find 
their way into the constitutional privacy literature.  What is more, these 
notions are backed by centuries of jurisprudence and doctrine that could be 
imported with little modification into the Fourth Amendment inquiry.  This 
Article begins (Part I) by laying out the law behind the third-party doctrine 
and its problematic conception of privacy as a kind of secrecy.  That Part 
also discusses Carpenter and some other representative solutions others have 
proposed, along with their significant shortcomings.  The Article then 
detours through an examination of privacy-as-confidentiality in the law of 
attorney-client privilege, emphasizing how it relates to third-party disclosures 
(Part II).  In its main substantive contribution, the Article weaves these two 
doctrinal threads together to show how Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
would benefit from viewing privacy as a kind of confidentiality (Part III).  
This development would allow the third-party doctrine to distinguish more 
meaningfully between cases when sharing information with a third party 
relinquishes one’s privacy interests, and, as importantly, when it does not.  In 
the course of discussing the detailed mechanics of a Fourth-Amendment 
confidentiality inquiry, the Article considers how it could have played out in 
Carpenter v. United States; the Court could have reached the same ruling, but 
with firmer theoretical foundation and more helpful guidance to lower courts 
who will, after Carpenter, be “kep[t] . . . guessing for years to come.”34 
 The argument below proceeds in the terms set by the Supreme Court 
and most Fourth Amendment scholars.  That discussion has been largely 
policy- and political-philosophy-oriented, and ahistorical.35  The central 
interpretive concept—privacy—is not directly mentioned in the 
Constitution.  While there is certainly interpretive value that rigorous 
originalist or textualist methods could bring to the questions addressed here, 
the Article does not consider them.  Rather, it seeks to validate the values 
recognized by the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  It 
does this by working within (to the extent possible) the Supreme Court’s 
 
 34 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 35 See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 552 (1999) 
(“The modern interpretation of ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ is the product of post-framing 
developments that the Framers did not anticipate.”). 
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present Fourth Amendment conceptual and doctrinal framework. 
I.  FOURTH AMENDMENT SECRETS 
 The Fourth Amendment shields our personal information from scrutiny 
by authorities.36  It guarantees our right to be secure in our “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”37  Its 
protection is not absolute, however.  Authorities can still access that 
information if they have a warrant supported by “probable cause.”38  
Furthermore, there is some personal information that the Fourth Amendment 
does not protect.39  This division—between unprotected personal information, 
personal information subject to a warrant, and personal information 
authorities cannot access—is the Constitution’s way of balancing individual 
privacy interests and the public interest in investigating misconduct.40  This 
Part discusses the concept underlying the line the Supreme Court has drawn 
between unprotected and protected information: secrecy. 
A.  The Third-Party Doctrine 
 The foundation of Fourth Amendment protection is the people’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in their bodies, spaces, and information.41  
Where a search would violate those expectations, the government must first 
obtain a warrant, backed by “reasonably trustworthy information” that the 
search will turn up evidence of crime.42  There is no certain means of 
predicting when and over what someone has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.43  As the phrase suggests, inquiry into reasonable expectations of 
 
 36 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 37 Id.  
 38 Id. 
 39 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121–22 (1984) (holding that, with regard to a 
police search and seizure of a package containing contraband, “it is well settled that it is 
constitutionally reasonable for law enforcement officials to seize ‘effects’ that cannot support a 
justifiable expectation of privacy”). 
 40 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment must 
balance an “individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security” with the 
government’s “need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order”). 
 41 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425 
U.S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 
U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality 
opinion); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).  
 42 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949). 
 43 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (holding that the Court will evaluate the “totality 
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privacy has both subjective and objective dimensions.  To begin, a person 
claiming Fourth Amendment protections must have had an actual, subjective 
expectation of privacy in the information.44  This requires that she believe the 
information is and should be private and that she seek to preserve its privacy.45  
The second, objective dimension asks whether her subjective expectation is 
“one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”46  Neither 
dimension seems to be particularly principled in its application.  There are 
few bright-line tests outside of some core cases, like the presumed privacy of 
things within the home.47  In cases beyond the core, the Court usually 
channels its often-outdated intuitions about what “people in general” think 
about privacy.48  One might expect that sociological data about evolving 
notions of privacy would assist the Court’s analysis, especially with respect to 
the objective prong of the inquiry.  Some Fourth Amendment scholars are 
starting to collect such evidence (especially as it pertains to electronic 
communications),49 but it has yet to find its way into Court opinions.50 
 Though the Court’s positive notion of privacy is frustratingly hard to pin 
down, the negative limits on what counts as private speak volumes.  The 
Court has recognized various circumstances in which a person has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  The “plain view” doctrine, for example, 
states that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in items or 
information that are plainly visible to police conducting an otherwise 
legitimate search.51  Similarly, the Court has held that people have no 
 
of the circumstances” when determining whether conduct breaches a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001)). 
 44 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 45 Id. at 351 (majority opinion). 
 46 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 47 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a 
warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 14–15 (2013) 
(holding that, as a bright-line rule, the use of a device not in public use to search details of a home 
that are not otherwise exposed to the public violates the Fourth Amendment).   
 48 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (“First, we doubt that people in general entertain 
any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.”).  But see Carpenter v. United States, 138 
S. Ct. 2206, 2265 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Politically insulated judges come armed with only 
the attorneys’ briefs, a few law clerks, and their own idiosyncratic experiences.  They are hardly the 
representative group you’d expect (or want) to be making empirical judgments for hundreds of millions 
of people.  Unsurprisingly, too, judicial judgments often fail to reflect public views.”). 
 49 Milton Heumann et al., Privacy and Surveillance: Public Attitudes on Cameras on the Street, in the Home, and 
in the Workplace, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 75 (2016) (discussing findings about the public 
perception of technological surveillance and privacy implications on the Fourth Amendment).   
 50 See L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2035–41 
(2011) (arguing against judicial reliance on legal assumptions rather than empirical data in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence).   
 51 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325–26 (1987); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 
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reasonable expectation of privacy in things held out to the public, like their 
street-side garbage.52  These legal doctrines about what privacy is not begin 
to suggest an implicit conception of what the Court thinks privacy is.  The 
key to privacy seems to be non-exposure, i.e., keeping items and information 
hidden from view. 
 The most constraining doctrinal limit on privacy is also the most 
illuminating.  According to the third-party doctrine, “a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to 
third parties.”53  The thought behind the third-party doctrine is that if a 
person is willing to share some information with other people, she cannot 
have really thought (and society is not prepared to recognize) that it was 
really all that private in the first place.  In a lot of cases, based on 
circumstances and who the third parties are, the third-party doctrine makes 
a lot of intuitive sense.  For example, the third-party doctrine applies to 
business and tax records that a defendant turns over to an accountant whom 
she knows has a mandatory duty to report.54   
 The Supreme Court has affirmed and extended what many had thought 
were the outer limits of the third-party doctrine’s logic.  These often are cases 
where people must rely on third-party service providers for basic aspects of 
their shared social and economic lives.  There were signs that the third-party 
doctrine could undermine Fourth Amendment interests as early as 1976, 
when the Court held that a person’s bank records are not subject to the 
warrant requirement.55  The bank, after all, is a third party.  This holding 
stands today, despite widespread recognition in the law that people have 
privacy interests in their financial information.56
 Similar reasoning in the following century established that phone records 
are not protected.57  Bank and phone records represent information in which 
it is at least debatable (Supreme Court rulings aside) whether people have a 
 
(1990) (“If an article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure would involve 
any invasion of privacy.”). 
 52 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (“Here, we conclude that respondents exposed 
their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
 53 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. 
 54 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (holding that turning over business and tax 
records to an accountant who was known to be duty-bound to report information negates a 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the records). 
 55 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976). 
 56 See Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 
(2012). 
 57 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (describing how the petitioner, by voluntarily conveying numerical 
information to the telephone company, “can claim no legitimate expectation of privacy”). 
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reasonable expectation of privacy.58  The third-party doctrine gave the Court 
an easy answer that allowed it to ignore difficult implications.  Today, it 
would apply to email accounts run by Microsoft or Google and to DNA data 
from services like 23andMe.59 
 The Supreme Court does recognize that the third-party doctrine may 
not always make sense.  In one important limitation, the Court held that 
privacy interests survive where, unknown to parties claiming the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment, the third party with access to their information 
was acting at the direction or encouragement of the government.60  Such 
third parties are “instrument of state” who are basically operating like covert 
government agents.61  Access by them does not compromise people’s privacy 
interests vis-à-vis the government because there is effectively no real third 
party.  Typical cases involve luggage handlers62 or hotel employees63 who, 
prompted by a federal investigator looking on, open customer bags or rooms 
to search for narcotics.  In these cases, the third party would not have pried 
into private information but for the government’s involvement.  Allowing 
police to circumvent the warrant requirement by engaging their own third 
parties would undermine basic Fourth Amendment protections. 
 The most recent limit on the third-party doctrine came this year in 
Carpenter.  The Court reaffirmed its commitment to the third-party doctrine,64 
but was asked how to extend it to cell-site data which “chronicle[s] a person’s 
past movements through the record of his cell phone signals.”65  A 
 
 58 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 446–47, 455 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing disagreement between 
majority and dissenting Justices on whether bank records are protected by the Fourth Amendment); 
see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 748, 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing disagreement between 
majority and dissenting Justices on whether phone records are protected by the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 59 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the troubling breadth of the third-party doctrine). 
 60 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971). 
 61 See id. (referring to the wife of the defendant as potentially being “an ‘instrument’ or agent of the 
state” in a police investigation). 
 62 See United States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 109 n.3 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that airport security actions 
implicate the Fourth Amendment when security checkpoint personnel are acting pursuant to 
federally prescribed regulations and directives). 
 63 See United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a search of a hotel room 
performed by a hotel employee, while working with the police, amounted to state action implicating 
the Fourth Amendment). 
 64 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (“We have previously held that ‘a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.’  That remains true 
‘even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited 
purpose.’” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976))). 
 65 Id. 
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straightforward application of the third-party doctrine would have found no 
Fourth Amendment protection since cell-site data is necessarily shared with 
third-party cell service providers.66  The Court decided that, “[g]iven the 
unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is 
held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth 
Amendment protection.”67  It is unclear what, if any, other sort of data shares 
that nature—its “uniqueness” suggests the answer may be none.68  Indeed, 
after Carpenter, even cell-site location records are excepted from Fourth 
Amendment protection by the third-party doctrine so long as they cover less 
than seven days of data.69  Given the extreme narrowness of Carpenter’s 
exception to the third-party doctrine, it does not impact the analysis below. 
 The logic and scope of the third-party doctrine suggest something about 
the Court’s understanding of privacy.  The third-party doctrine says (with 
rare exception) that when person A shares something with person B, it is no 
longer private.  This is the informational logic of secrets.70  Once information 
is provided to another person, its secrecy is compromised.  The law 
recognizes this logic outside of the Fourth Amendment context.  State secrets 
and trade secrets represent information that must not be shared, on pains of 
compromising the protections the law gives them.71  Secrets are fragile and 
must be jealously guarded. 
 The practical impact of the Court’s conception of privacy-as-secrecy was 
limited in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the third-party 
doctrine was taking off.  Social and economic structures were such that, with 
some exceptions like phone and bank records, relatively few transactions 
were memorialized.  People could go about ordinary life interacting with the 
third parties they depended on in relative confidence that it did not matter 
that their exchanges may not be secret.   
 
 
 66 Id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“I cannot fault the Sixth Circuit for holding that Smith and 
Miller extinguish any Katz-based Fourth Amendment interest in third party cell-site data.”). 
 67 Id. at 2217 (majority opinion) (emphasis altered). 
 68 Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court does not explain what makes something a 
distinct category of information [like cell-site data].”). 
 69 Id. at 2217 n.3 (majority opinion). 
 70 SCHULHOFER, supra note 23, at 8–9 (arguing that the Court understands privacy as a form of 
secrecy). 
 71 Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953) (“Of course, as the term [trade secret] 
demands, the knowledge cannot be placed in the public domain and still be retained as a ‘secret’.”); 
see also Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1249, 1252, 1293 (2007) (arguing that a survey of state secret cases suggests that disclosure of 
information to the public would defeat the privilege).  
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 Investigation and surveillance were expensive in-person affairs.72  
Without the aid of the sort of totalitarian information networks present in 
East Germany and the Soviet Union,73 relatively few people could actually 
be people of interest.  In the United States, there was safety in numbers.  
Budgetary and structural limits left plenty of room for most people to transact 
with each other, free from any real fear of unreasonable government searches 
into their personal lives. 
 Today is different in several respects.  One important development of 
the twenty-first century is that third-party service providers have their own 
third parties.  This is the interconnected world of Facebook and Venmo, 
where third-party service providers facilitate most social and economic 
transactions.  Facebook and Venmo then implicate yet further third parties, 
like the cell service providers or ISPs through which we access their services.  
Every email we send, every website we visit, every file we store on the cloud, 
every credit card we swipe, and every phone call we make utilize several 
third-party platforms.  As a result, the vast majority of government 
information requests to companies like cell carriers are not subject to the 
warrant requirement.  Just obtaining subpoenas will often suffice,74 and the 
process for securing these give your data relatively little protection.75 
 A second major development is that people now transmit information 
about themselves to third-party service providers, even when there is no 
obvious human or commercial counterparty.  Walking alone on the sidewalk 
 
 72 Andy Greenberg, Cell Phones Let Cops Track People for a Thousandth of the Price, Study Finds, FORBES (Jan. 
9, 2014, 6:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2014/01/09/cell-phones-let-
cops-track-people-for-a-thousandth-of-the-price-study-finds/#7dcd88bf5e2e. 
 73 One person out of every sixty-six were government informants in East Germany.  JOHN O. 
KOEHLER, STASI: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE EAST GERMAN POLICE 9 (1999) (noting that one-
in-sixty-six East Germans were government informants).  The number in the U.S.S.R. may have 
been as high as one-in-ten.  Compare ROBERT W. STEPHAN, STALIN’S SECRET WAR: SOVIET 
COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THE NAZIS 61 (2003) (noting that the U.S.S.R. may have had 
as many as twenty million informants), with Victor P. Petrov, Some Observations on the 1959 Soviet 
Census, 18 RUSSIAN REV. 332, 332 (1959) (citing the 1959 Soviet Census which put the population 
of the U.S.S.R. at over two-hundred million from 1959 onwards).  Other estimates go as low as one 
in one hundred.  For further information on Soviet information networks, see generally Amir 
Weiner & Aigi Rahi-Tamm, Getting to Know You: The Soviet Surveillance System, 1939–57, 13 KRITIKA: 
EXPLORATIONS RUSSIAN & EURASIAN HIST. 5 (2012). 
 74 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012); Letter from John C. Gockley, Vice-
President, Legal & Regulatory Affairs of U.S. Cellular to Edward J. Markey, U.S. Senator (Oct. 1, 
2013), available at https://www.markey.senate.gov/documents/2013-12-
09_USCellular_CarrierResponse.pdf. 
 75 SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 93.  There are some weak statutory protections for email and phone 
records, but these are changeable and do not provide the level of security ensured by the Fourth 
Amendment.  See SCHULHOFER, supra note 23, at 128. 
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or room to room in their houses, people unwittingly take several third parties 
along with them if their phone happens to be in their pocket.  Cell service 
providers track user location in real time,76 as do the developers of the 
phone’s apps—anything from flashlight apps77 to innocuous-seeming games 
like Angry Birds and Candy Crush.78  Sitting still while watching cat videos, 
researching vinyl siding, or trying to diagnose a rash, there is no obvious sign 
of the dozens of third-party marketers and their cookies who could be 
watching.79   
 A third major development is that our social and economic transactions 
are meticulously recorded and digitally searchable.80  This all but eliminates 
the transaction costs of surveillance that, for much of the history of the third-
party doctrine, were a practical shield for most personal information.  
Advertisers will pay top dollar for insights into people’s preferences, and 
third-party service providers have responded in kind.  Analysts like Sense 
Networks crunch personal cell-location data to make valuable user profiles.81  
Companies like Facebook generate user profiles from their own data, which 
can include over one thousand pages of text for each active user.82  Other 
companies compile data from several service providers to package and sell.  
One such company, Acxiom, claims to have 1,500 data points on over 
 
 76 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (“Most modern devices, such as 
smartphones, tap into the wireless networks several times a minute whenever their signal is on 
. . . .”).  They are required by law to do this, though, as discussed infra pp. 499–500, there is a profit 
motive too.  See Fact Sheet: FCC Wireless 911 Requirements, FCC (Jan. 2001), 
https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/services/911-
services/enhanced911/archives/factsheet_requirements_012001.pdf. 
 77 Ashley Feinberg, Popular Android Flashlight App Straight-Up Lied About Selling Data, GIZMODO (Dec. 6, 
2013, 10:41 AM), http://gizmodo.com/popular-android-flashlight-app-straight-up-lied-about-s-
1477916270. 
 78 Jordan Robertson, Leaked Docs: NSA Uses ‘Candy Crush,’ ‘Angry Birds’ to Spy, SFGATE (Jan. 29, 2014), 
http://www.sfgate.com/technology/article/Leaked-docs-NSA-uses-Candy-Crush-Angry-
5186801.php (last updated Jan. 29, 2014, 5:07 PM). 
 79 Fresh Air: Tracking the Companies that Track You Online, NPR (Aug. 19, 2010, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129298003. 
 80 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“[T]he retrospective quality of [cell-site location information] gives 
police access to a category of information otherwise unknowable.  In the past, attempts to 
reconstruct a person’s movements were limited by a dearth of records and the frailties of 
recollection.”). 
 81 Hiawatha Bray, Cellphone Data Mined to Create Personal Profiles, BOS. GLOBE (July 8, 2013), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/07/07/your-cellphone-
yourself/eSvTK1UCqNOE7D4qbAcWPL/story.html. 
 82 Olivia Solon, How Much Data Did Facebook Have on One Man? 1,200 Pages of Data in 57 Categories, 
WIRED (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2012/12/start/privacy-
versus-facebook. 
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700,000,000 people.83  It should be unsurprising, then, that former Google 
CEO Eric Schmidt could honestly say, “We know where you are.  We know 
where you’ve been.  We can more or less [k]now what you’re thinking 
about.”84  Third-party service providers record and compile personal 
information on a scale that was not technologically feasible a short while ago. 
 Some of the customers for this data are state and federal authorities.  The 
third-party doctrine washes away any scruples about warrants and allows the 
government to purchase personal information that would have been 
prohibitively expensive to gather just decades ago.  Third-party service 
providers cultivate lucrative and long-lasting commercial relationships with 
government buyers.85  AT&T, for example, charges the government twenty-
five dollars per day to track a phone,86 and Sprint charges thirty dollars for a 
full month.87  This is a fraction of the cost of traditional surveillance,88 so 
police can send cell companies millions of data requests each year.89  Cell 
companies have even developed automated web interfaces to keep up with 
demand.90  For the federal government alone, intelligence contracts amount 
to $56 billion each year.91  As one leading commentator observed, “corporate 
and government surveillance interests have converged.”92  It is the third-
party doctrine that allowed them to. 
 If third parties are not willing to share customer information with police, 
the government often has the option of taking it, again without the need for 
a warrant.  One common route is the Stored Communications Act, which 
 
 83 Adi Kamdar, Data Broker Acxiom Launches Transparency Tool, but Consumers Still Lack Control, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/data-broker-
acxiom-launches-transparency-tool-consumers-lack-control. 
 84 Derek Thompson, Google’s CEO: ‘The Laws Are Written by Lobbyists’, ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2010), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/10/googles-ceo-the-laws-are-written-by-
lobbyists/63908. 
 85 Farhad Manjoo, Acxiom Is Watching You, SALON (Feb. 10, 2004, 8:30 PM), 
https://www.salon.com/2004/02/10/acxiom/. 
 86 Theodoric Meyer, No Warrant, No Problem: How the Government Can Get Your Digital Data, PROPUBLICA 
(Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.propublica.org/article/no-warrant-no-problem-how-the-
government-can-still-get-your-digital-data (last updated June 27, 2014, 10:29 AM). 
 87 Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of Surveillance: Making Cents out of 
United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 349 (2014). 
 88 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018) (“[C]ell phone tracking is remarkably 
easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools.”). 
 89 Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2012, at A1. 
 90 Christopher Soghoian, 8 Million Reasons for Real Surveillance Oversight, SLIGHT PARANOIA (Dec. 1, 
2009), http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2009/12/8-million-reasons-for-real-surveillance.html. 
 91 Tim Shorrock, Opinion, Put the Spies Back Under One Roof, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/opinion/put-the-spies-back-under-one-roof.html. 
 92 BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND 
CONTROL YOUR WORLD 29 (2015). 
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was at issue in Carpenter.93  Passed in 1986, the Act allows the government to 
subpoena telecommunications records upon showing a judge “reasonable 
grounds to believe” the records are “relevant and material” to a criminal 
investigation.94  Shortly after 9/11, the government acquired further 
subpoena powers.  Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act,95 which 
amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) by weakening 
restrictions on domestic surveillance by the government.  Domestic 
surveillance is now permitted so long as foreign intelligence gathering is a 
“significant purpose;” previously, it had to be “the purpose.”96  The National 
Security Agency understands the Act to allow them to send “national security 
letters” to corporations demanding the records, files, emails, etc., of their 
customers.97  These FISA “requests” generally do not require a warrant; 
when they do, the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court seems to 
grant them as a matter of course.98  Companies that do not comply with 
national security letters face stiff penalties.  In one instance, the National 
Security Agency threatened Yahoo with a fine of $250,000 per day if it 
refused to turn over user data; that figure was set to double every week.99  
After just two months, the fine would have been $64 million per day. 
 As a result of these developments, the third-party doctrine poses a 
widespread threat to much of people’s most private information.  The next 
Section considers various proposals about how Fourth Amendment law 
 
 93 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.  
 94 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
 95 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).  
 96 § 218, 115 Stat. at 291 (second emphasis added). 
 97 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment 
to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 525 (2006) (“[T]he 2001 USA PATRIOT 
Act . . . authorized a system of National Security Letters that the FBI has employed with increasing 
frequency in a wide variety of situations with only remote connections to the goal of preventing 
terrorism.”); Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1306, 1332 (2004) (“The Patriot Act significantly expanded the scope of the little-known tool of 
‘National Security Letters.’”); see also Russell L. Weaver, Cybersurveillance in a Free Society, 72 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1207, 1237 (2015) (“[W]hen the NSA sends a National Security Letter to a 
telecommunications company, it usually includes an order precluding the company from publicly 
acknowledging the letters or the disclosures or even from alerting their customers.”). 
 98 SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 130;  Erika Eichelberger, FISA Court Has Rejected .03 Percent of All Government 
Surveillance Requests, MOTHER JONES (June 10, 2013, 5:30 PM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/06/fisa-court-nsa-spying-opinion-reject-request; 
Colin Schultz, The FISA Court Has Only Denied an NSA Request Once in the Past 5 Years, SMITHSONIAN 
(May 1, 2014), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/fisa-court-has-only-denied-nsa-
request-once-past-5-years-180951313/. 
 99 Dominic Rushe, Yahoo $250,000 Daily Fine over NSA Data Refusal Was Set to Double ‘Every Week’, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:33 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/11/yahoo-
nsa-lawsuit-documents-fine-user-data-refusal. 
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should adapt. 
B.  Scholarly Criticism 
 Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt once remarked: “If you have 
something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be 
doing it in the first place.”100  The concern of the Fourth Amendment is not 
to give people space to do things they “shouldn’t be doing.”  Rather, the 
concern is to allow people to live core areas of their personal lives with the 
dignity that excludes onlookers.101  It is to permit people space to do those 
unpopular or disfavored things which authorities merely think people 
“shouldn’t be doing.”  When the government intrudes on this space, it risks 
sliding into the sort of totalitarianism that the United States spent forty-five 
years resisting.  In the words of Justice William O. Douglas:  
When an intelligence officer looks over every nonconformist’s shoulder in 
the library, or walks invisibly by his side in a picket line, or infiltrates his club, 
the America once extolled as the voice of liberty heard around the world no 
longer is cast in the image which Jefferson and Madison designed, but more 
in the Russian image . . . .102   
As Justice Sotomayor has recently observed, Fourth Amendment protections 
are also crucial to ensuring the exercise of other constitutional guarantees: 
“Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and 
expressive freedoms.”103  People share information with third parties all the 
time—the colleagues, friends, and corporations they interact with on a daily 
basis.  That is a social and economic necessity.  But when those with the 
power to punish have access to that same information, the stakes change.104  
The power to punish is the power to suppress messages and identities that 
are unpopular or perceived to be threatening.  The disfavored messages and 
 
 100 Google CEO on Privacy (VIDEO): ‘If You Have Something You Don’t Want Anyone to Know, Maybe You 
Shouldn’t Be Doing It’, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/07/google-ceo-on-privacy-if_n_383105.html (last 
updated Dec. 6, 2017). 
 101 See John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 655, 664, 681 
(explaining that while privacy is the overarching rationale behind the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirement of reasonable searches, “[t]he Court . . . has intermittently cited the protection of 
human dignity as a concern under the Fourth Amendment”). 
 102 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 103 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 104 ROBERT SCHEER, THEY KNOW EVERYTHING ABOUT YOU: HOW DATA-COLLECTING 
CORPORATIONS AND SNOOPING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ARE DESTROYING DEMOCRACY 14 
(2015) (“It is one thing to have a private company mine your data for better leads on shopping or 
viewing but quite another for your government to be doing that snooping . . . .”). 
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identities of one day are the seeds of social progress for the next.105 
 Scholars have proposed different ways of resolving the tension between 
the Fourth Amendment and the third-party doctrine in the present day.  One 
solution could be to abandon or severely limit the third-party doctrine.106  
However, the Court is unlikely to set aside over forty years of third-party 
jurisprudence.107  Not only are judicial habits hard to break, but the third-
party doctrine often makes sense and has a crucial role to play in keeping us 
safe.  The Fourth Amendment is a balance of interests between protecting 
privacy and providing authorities with the information they need to protect 
the public.108  When authorities have less information, they are less able to 
prevent crime and its harmful consequences.109  That safety mission should 
be compromised only when there are counterbalancing interests that 
outweigh those of future victims.  The third-party doctrine appropriately 
identifies some scenarios where those counterbalancing interests are weak or 
non-existent.  Sharing something during a loud conversation on the subway 
or to hundreds of friends on Facebook suggests that the dignity interests that 
may otherwise attach to that information are weak or have been voluntarily 
forfeited.110  Similarly, the concerns about chilled speech or association that 
Justices Douglas and Sotomayor raised are less immediate for parties who 
 
 105 See Lyman Abbott, Why Women Do Not Wish the Suffrage, ATLANTIC (Sept. 1903), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1903/09/why-women-do-not-wish-the-
suffrage/306616/ (“In 1895 the women of Massachusetts were asked by the state whether they 
wished the suffrage.  Of the 575,000 voting women in the state, only 22,204 cared for it enough to 
deposit in a ballot box an affirmative answer to this question.  That is, in round numbers, less than 
four per cent wished to vote; about ninety-six per cent were opposed to woman suffrage or 
indifferent to it.  That this expresses fairly well the average sentiment throughout the country can 
hardly be questioned.”). 
 106 Saby Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting the Third-Party Doctrine of the Fourth 
Amendment, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 33, 84 (2011) (“[T]he third-party doctrine of the Fourth 
Amendment has come to a breaking point . . . .”); Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth 
Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 247, 268 (2016) 
(“[A]pplying the third-party rule in today’s world is inconsistent with the history and purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
 107 A version of the third-party doctrine first entered Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in 1976.  Price, 
supra note 106, at 264 (“The ‘third-party doctrine’ originated with two Supreme Court decisions in 
the late 1970s, United States v. Miller  and Smith v. Maryland.”). 
 108 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014) (balancing the government and privacy 
interests in deciding whether to apply the Fourth Amendment’s search incident to arrest exception 
to cell phones). 
 109 Kerr, supra note 22, at 573. 
 110 See Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2010, 
8:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy (explaining 
Mark Zuckerberg’s view that people have become comfortable making all sorts of previously private 
personal information public). 
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feel safe speaking and associating openly.111 
 A different approach that some scholars prefer would be to patch the 
doctrine from the outside by using legislation to require third-party service 
providers to be more transparent to consumers about what will and could 
happen with their data.112  Europe, for example, has much more demanding 
data transparency laws.113  The Department of Commerce runs a program 
that registers United States companies as “Safe Harbor Compliant,” 
meaning that their data-use policies satisfy European Union requirements.114  
More data transparency in the United States would certainly be an 
improvement, but it is doubtful that would help with the concerns raised 
here.  It could educate users about the current legal implications of using 
third-party services,115 but for that to make a difference, people need to have 
a real alternative to sharing their information.  Modern social and economic 
realities leave people no choice but to make use of the third-party services 
providers that assist their phones, laptops, and watches.116  Those with 
 
 111 See Mary Madden et al., Teens, Social Media, and Privacy, PEW RES. CTR. (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/05/21/teens-social-media-and-privacy/ (“Teen social media 
users do not express a high level of concern about third-party access to their data . . . .”).  
 112 See Mary Graw Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones: Commercial Erosion of Fourth 
Amendment Protection in a Post Google Earth World, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 334 (2012) (“This Article 
proposes a new legislative framework for respecting privacy protections in response to these 
commercial-induced privacy affronts.  This framework, supported by analogous American law and 
European proposals, calls for an opt-in model: before an individual can be assumed to have 
voluntarily sacrificed his privacy, he must affirmatively opt in to allow the use of his private data. The 
opt-in must, however, be meaningful and not an unfair component of a terms of service agreement.”). 
 113 See The OECD Privacy Framework, OECD (2013), https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/ 
oecd_privacy_framework.pdf (“Openness Principle . . . There should be a general policy of 
openness about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data.”). 
 114 See Search the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor List, EXPORT.GOV, https://www.export.gov/safeharbor_eu (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2018); see also Letter from Penny Pritzker, Sec’y of Commerce, U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, to Vera Jourová, Comm’r for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equal., European 
Comm’n (Feb. 23, 2016), available at https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/ 
media/files/2016/eu_us_privacy_shield_full_text.pdf.pdf; Letter from Edith Ramirez, 
Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Vera Jourová, Comm’r for Justice, Consumers and Gender 
Equal., European Comm’n (Feb. 23, 2016), available at https://www.commerce.gov/sites/ 
commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/eu_us_privacy_shield_full_text.pdf.pdf. 
 115 Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez & Srikanth Sundaresan, 7 in 10 Smartphone Apps Share Your Data with Third-
Party Services, CONVERSATION (May 29, 2017, 9:48 PM), https://theconversation.com/7-in-10-
smartphone-apps-share-your-data-with-third-party-services-72404 (“Transparency, education and 
strong regulatory frameworks are the key.  Users need to know what information about them is 
being collected, by whom, and what it’s being used for.   Only then can we as a society decide what 
privacy protections are appropriate, and put them in place.  Our findings, and those of many other 
researchers, can help turn the tables and track the trackers themselves.”). 
 116 Id.; see also Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth Amendment Limits of the Third 
Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1929 (2017) [hereinafter If These Walls Could Talk] (“[I]t’s 
not clear that our modern consistent conveyance of personal information to third parties is . . . 
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sufficient resources117 can pay for premium privacy-protective services that 
function without access to customer data—like Riseup118 for email or 
SpiderOak119 for cloud storage.  But relying on for-pay services risks making 
privacy a privilege for the privileged.  “[T]he Constitution doesn’t prefer the 
rich over the poor . . . .”120   
 More promising proposals for addressing the overreach of the third-
party doctrine work from within.  One such approach focuses on the notion 
of consent.121  The third-party doctrine only applies to information that has 
been “voluntarily” turned over to third parties.122  Most third-party service 
 
voluntary . . . .  Increasingly, disclosure of such information is necessary to participate in modern 
life.”); Ghoshray, supra note 106, at 74–75 (“This voluntary-involuntary distinction falls flat on its 
face when confronted with the stark reality that the post-modern individual conducts life through 
the enabling means of the Internet and may, indeed, have a fundamental right to Internet access.”). 
 117 See, e.g., Matt Sledge, Alex Kozinski, Federal Judge, Would Pay $2,400 a Year, Max, for Privacy, 
HUFFINGTON POST (March 4, 2013, 5:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/04/ 
alex-kozinski-privacy_n_2807608.html.  See generally JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST 
FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE (2014). 
 118 See About Us, RISEUP, https://riseup.net/en/about-us (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) (“Can you rely on 
a corporate email provider for confidentiality of your sensitive email communications?  Not only 
do they typically scan and record the content of your messages for a wide variety of purposes, they 
also concede to the demands of governments that restrict digital freedom and fail to have strict 
policies regarding their user’s privacy.”). 
 119 See The SpiderOak Collaboration Suite, SPIDEROAK, https://spideroak.com/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) 
(“For over 10 years, SpiderOak has built software based on a singular, unwavering belief: that the 
world is a better place if software is trustworthy and secure.  SpiderOak software allows you to 
communicate, collaborate, and organize within the confines of the most restrictive compliance 
regulations.”). 
 120 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 121 See Mary Graw Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof—Saving the Fourth Amendment from Commercial Conditioning 
by Reviving Voluntariness in Disclosures to Third Parties, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 374 (2013) (“By 
reinvigorating voluntariness into the search jurisprudence and the Third Party doctrine, this 
proposal suggests only a minor adjustment in current law.”); see also If These Walls Could Talk, supra 
note 116, at 1925; Leary, supra note 112, at 334. 
 122 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“[A] person has no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“[T]he question whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was 
the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from 
the totality of all the circumstances.  While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to 
be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an 
effective consent.  As with police questioning, two competing concerns must be accommodated in 
determining the meaning of a ‘voluntary’ consent—the legitimate need for such searches and the 
equally important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion.”); In re Application of the United 
States, 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 133 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“Even if Petitioners had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in IP address information collected by Twitter, Petitioners voluntarily relinquished any 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the third-party doctrine.  To access Twitter, Petitioners 
had to disclose their IP addresses to third parties.  This voluntary disclosure—built directly into the 
architecture of the Internet—has significant Fourth Amendment consequences under the third-
party doctrine, as articulated in United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland.”). 
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providers ask users to click “I Agree” to some sort of privacy disclosure.123  
But the average person cannot understand the legalese in which these are 
usually written.124  Even if she can understand which information she is 
sharing, fully appreciating the significance of doing so requires some 
background in data science.125  “Anonymous location data” (which many 
privacy policies say service providers collect) sounds like it protects a person’s 
identity.  Yet, as data researchers have shown, it does not—just four 
“anonymous” date/location points will identify a person with ninety-five 
percent accuracy.126  Are people really consenting to turn over their 
information when they do not understand what information that is or the 
implications of doing so?  Some of the data transparency initiatives discussed 
above may help address this consent concern, but, once again, only if people 
have alternatives to agreeing to the data policies of the third-party service 
providers.  The other side of the worry with the consent argument is that it 
risks proving too much.  If people never really consent when they click “I 
Agree,” the third-party doctrine will be severely compromised, and the 
ability of authorities to protect us along with it. 
 A different kind of argument, again working within the framework of the 
third-party doctrine, may help rein in the doctrine for some service 
 
 123 See Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services, 
81 Fed. Reg. 87,274, 87,275 (Dec. 2, 2016) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 64) (“We adopt rules 
requiring carriers to obtain customers’ opt-in approval for use and sharing of sensitive customer PI 
(and for material retroactive changes to carriers’ privacy policies).  A familiar example of opt-in 
practices appears when a mobile application asks for permission to use geo-location information.”). 
 124 See Alex Kozinski & Mihailis E. Diamantis, An Eerie Feeling of Déjà Vu: From Soviet Snitches to Angry Birds, 
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 425 (David Gray & Stephen E. 
Henderson eds., 2017) (“The privacy agreements are written by lawyers and techies, for lawyers 
and techies, usually with no effort to make them penetrable to the vast majority of users.”); Umika 
Pidaparthy, What You Should Know About iTunes’ 56-Page Legal Terms, CNN (May 6, 2011, 7:08 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/web/05/06/itunes.terms/index.html (noting the opinion of 
technology attorney Mark Grossman that “[m]ost people really just don’t understand digital rights 
management”); see also David Berreby, Click to Agree with What? No One Reads Terms of Service, Studies 
Confirm, GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2017, 8:38 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/ 
mar/03/terms-of-service-online-contracts-fine-print (“Only a quarter of the 543 students even 
bothered to look at the fine print.  But ‘look’ is not ‘read’: on average, these more careful joiners 
spent around a minute with the thousands of words that make up NameDrop’s privacy and service 
agreements.  And then they all agreed to them.”). 
 125 See Kozinski & Diamantis, supra note 124, at 425 (“Suppose you are a lawyer with the extraordinary 
patience to read a privacy agreement.  You may understand what you’ve agreed to formally.  But 
unless you know a good deal about big data science, you probably have no idea what you’ve really 
agreed to.  The app developers, and whomever else they sell your data to, will know the information 
you’ve allowed them to collect, but also everything they can infer from aggregating all the 
information.  Those inferences are the most valuable part.”). 
 126 See Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human Mobility, 
NATURE (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376. 
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providers.127  Recall that the third-party doctrine does not apply when the third 
party is an instrument of state, acting with too much direction or 
encouragement from the government.128  Courts consider two factors when 
determining whether a third party is an instrument of state: 1) the degree of 
government involvement, knowledge, and acquiescence, and 2) the intent of 
the party conducting the search.129  Some third-party service providers satisfy 
these factors quite nicely because the government’s level of involvement, 
knowledge, and acquiescence in collecting that data is extremely high.  
Consider, for example, cell companies that log user geolocation data.  On the 
front end, the federal government requires cell companies to do this for 911 
emergency response purposes.130  Then, on the back end, the government 
purchases the location data the cell companies collect.131  The government is 
involved, albeit not directly, throughout the process.  This makes cell 
companies, at least so far as customer geolocation is concerned, seem a lot like 
instruments of state rather than third parties.  In other cases, though, the 
factors will not so clearly mark a third-party service provider as an instrument 
of state.  Most will likely fall in the “gray area” of all balancing tests and require 
individualized consideration.132  A more sweeping fix would be preferable. 
 A final approach to fixing the third-party doctrine, and the approach 
adopted by this Article, is to ask whether the Supreme Court has an adequate 
understanding of “privacy,” the reasonable expectation of which the Fourth 
Amendment protects.  As argued above, the Supreme Court’s implicit 
conception of privacy is as a kind of secrecy.  That is the best explanation of 
why the third-party doctrine has been given such a long reach—secrets told 
to third parties are secrets no more.  Other scholars have recognized that 
there are different understandings of privacy and that the Court’s is 
unnecessarily restrictive.133  Things we share with our spouses, friends, and 
doctors are private, even if they are no longer totally secret.  What is needed 
is an alternate theory. 
 
 127 See Kozinski & Diamantis, supra note 124, at 436 (“The infrastructure for a potential surveillance 
state is in place, and it is largely in private hands. . . .  The third-party doctrine, which currently 
gives the government easy access to any information that passes through the private infrastructure, 
is dangerously outdated.  We . . . suggest[ ] . . . treating many corporations with access to customer 
data as instruments of state.”). 
 128 See id. at 433. 
 129 United Sates v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 130 See Fact Sheet: FCC Wireless 911 Requirements, supra note 76. 
 131 See Kozinski & Diamantis, supra note 124, at 424 (“Data brokers make good money when the 
government buys data that would cost much more to acquire itself.”). 
 132 Walther, 652 F.2d at 791. 
 133 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 23, at 8 (“The idea that privacy means secrecy is too narrow even 
when we think only about personal information . . . .”). 
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 Stephen J. Schulhofer suggests that privacy is about having control over 
our information rather than keeping it secret.134  This seems like a step in the 
right direction.  Schulhofer’s conception of privacy recognizes that people 
can share information with third parties in ways that nonetheless maintain 
its privacy.135  He argues that his privacy-as-control approach would require 
the government to get a warrant for customer data held by service providers 
when customers have no realistic alternative but to provide their 
information.136  So far so good.  But Schulhofer’s proposal is unlikely to get 
Supreme Court buy-in.  It is an entirely new theory of privacy.  While the 
Court does sometimes make dramatic pivots in doctrine, it tends to prefer 
incremental change built on familiarity.137  Since Schulhofer’s approach has 
no precedent in law, its boundaries and implications are difficult to 
anticipate.  For example, what happens in cases where control and privacy 
seem to come apart, as when someone tells everyone but a single frenemy 
about an upcoming party?  This seems like a situation that involves 
meticulous control over information, but no intuitive privacy interest 
deserving constitutional protection. 
 The Court would be more likely to accept a more familiar and well-
litigated notion of privacy, with established contours and implications.  It is 
to this that the Article now turns. 
II.  ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENCES 
 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is not the only area of law where the 
concept of privacy has an important role to play.  Tort law recognizes a cause 
of action for invasion of privacy.138  Statutory schemes like the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act139 and the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act140  direct custodians of certain private information to 
 
 134 Id. at 8–9. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 140–42. 
 137 See generally Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured Constitutional Steps, 71 IND. L.J. 297 (1996) (discussing the 
tendency of courts to rule narrowly with incremental changes to doctrine, as opposed to broadly 
with drastic changes to doctrine). 
 138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST., 1977) (“One who intentionally 
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or 
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”). 
 139 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 1177, 110 
Stat. 1936, 2029 (1996) (detailing the offense and penalties of wrongful disclosure of individually 
identifiable health information). 
 140 Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(b)(1)(L) (2012) (describing the 
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prevent outside access.  And common law evidentiary privileges protect some 
private information from discovery, whether by opposing parties or by the 
government.141  It is surprising that Fourth Amendment privacy scholars 
have underappreciated these reserves of insight into what privacy is and can 
be.  Evidentiary privilege should be a particularly appealing resource because 
it can serve to protect information from the government, even in the face of 
a duly issued search warrant.142  Focusing on attorney-client privilege, this 
Part starts to unpack the potential benefits of such doctrinal cross-pollination.  
A.  Background to the Attorney-Client Privilege 
 Attorney-client privilege is a common law doctrine that applies in state 
and federal courts alike.143  Among common law privileges, it is the oldest.144  
It emerged in England nearly five hundred years ago as part of the law of 
witnesses.145  The jury trial was just starting to replace outmoded practices 
like trial by ordeal or combat,146 which sought to channel divine judgment 
 
importance of an agency caseworker or other representative of a State and local child welfare 
agency not disclosing a student’s case plan). 
 141 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331–32 (1950) (“‘[T]he public . . . has a right to every man’s 
evidence.  When we come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary 
assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that 
any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional . . . .’  Every exemption from testifying 
or producing records thus presupposes a very real interest to be protected.  If a privilege based upon 
that interest is asserted, its validity must be assessed.” (footnote omitted)); see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 
518 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1996) (discussing patient-therapist privilege); Trammel v. United States, 455 
U.S. 40, 41–42 (1980) (discussing spousal privilege); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 
384–85 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing confessional privilege). 
 142 See United States v. Taylor, 764 F. Supp. 2d 230, 236 (D. Me. 2011) (showing that the government 
must use a filtering agent to cull out potentially privileged information before reviewing emails 
obtained pursuant to a search warrant); Nat’l City Trading Corp. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1020, 
1026 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[A] law office search should be executed with special care to avoid 
unnecessary intrusion on attorney-client communications . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
ATT’Y MANUAL § 9-13.420(E) (“[E]very effort should be made to avoid viewing privileged material 
[during a search].”); Eric D. McArthur, The Search and Seizure of Privileged Attorney-Client 
Communications, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 756 (2005) (“[P]rivileged attorney-client communications 
cannot be searched and seized.”). 
 143 FED. R. EVID. 501 (“The common law—as interpreted by the United States courts in light of reason 
and experience—governs a claim of privilege . . . .”). 
 144 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).  
 145 1 PAUL R. RICE ET AL., ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:2 (2017), 
Westlaw; see also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 2 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
5:13, at n.1 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated June 2018) [hereinafter FEDERAL EVIDENCE] 
(citing Berd v. Lovelace (1577) 21 Eng. Rep. 33; Cary 62; Dennis v. Codrington (1580) 21 Eng. 
Rep. 53; Cary 100).  
 146 RICE ET AL., supra note 145. 
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through harrowing feats.147  Without access to a Judge on high to render 
verdicts, courts needed human witnesses to testify about the facts during trial.  
Parliament responded by passing the Statute Against Perjury in 1562,148 
which enabled courts to compel witnesses to testify.  Because the law at the 
time did not permit parties to testify in their own cases, litigants instead 
sought to compel testimony from their opponents’ lawyers.149  The first 
attorney-client privilege cases emerged soon after to address the obvious 
problems this dynamic raised.150   
 The justification common law courts gave for the privilege shifted about 
over the centuries.  Originally, the stated purpose behind the doctrine was to 
protect attorneys’ honor, since they were duty-bound to keep client 
confidences.151  As a consequence, courts originally ruled that it was the 
attorney rather than the client who held and controlled the privilege.152  
Society and attorneys clearly understood that revealing a client’s confidences 
would be an act of betrayal153 at which “[e]very feeling of justice, honour and 
humanity[ ] would be shocked.”154  Thus, at their core, such “humanistic” 
 
 147 Trisha Olson, Of Enchantment: The Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury Trial, 50 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 109, 117 (2000) (“The proofs cited most routinely are the ordeal of the iron, which consisted 
of a proband carrying a red-hot iron for a specified distance, and the ordeal of the cauldron, which 
required him to pluck an object from boiling water.  An affirmative judgment required that the 
wound heal cleanly within three days time.” (footnotes omitted) (citing ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL 
BY FIRE AND WATER 13–22 (1986); then citing R.S. VAN CAENEGEM, LEGAL HISTORY: A 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 75–76 (1991))).  
 148 See Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1455 n.9 (1985) (noting 
that the Statute Against Perjury imposed a “universal duty” on witnesses to testify when called upon). 
 149 See RICE ET AL., supra note 145. 
 150 Id.; see also Austen v. Vesey (1577) 21 Eng. Rep. 34, 34; Cary 63, 63; Berd v. Lovelace (1577) 21 
Eng. Rep. 33, 33; Cary 62, 62 (“Thomas Hawtry, gentleman, was served with a subpoena to testify 
his knowledge touching the cause in variance; and made oath that he bath been, and yet is a solicitor 
in this suit, and hath received several fees of the defendant; which being informed to the Master of 
the Rolls, it is ordered that the said Thomas Hawtry shall not be compelled to be deposed, touching 
the same, and that he shall be in no danger of any contempt, touching the not executing of the said 
process . . . .”). 
 151 See Anonymus (1694) 90 Eng. Rep. 179, 179–80; Skinner 404, 404 (“In a trial at Nisi Prius in 
Westminster, one Saunders an attorney who had drawn an indenture of agreement between a 
sheriff and his under-sheriff, being produced to prove a corrupt agreement between them; he was 
not compelled to discover the matter of it, though he was not a counsellor; and per Holt Chief 
Justice, it seems to be the same law of a scrivener; and he cited a case where upon a covenant to 
convey as counsel shall advise, & consilium non dedit advisamentum being pleaded, conveyances 
made by the advice of a scrivener being tendred and refused, was allowed to be good evidence upon 
this issue; for he is a counsel to a man, with whom he will advise; if he be instructed and educated 
in such way of practice, otherwise of a gentleman, parson . . . .”). 
 152 Id.  
 153 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & EDWARD L. BARRETT, JR., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE 
ON EVIDENCE § 2.3, at 169–71 (Richard D. Friedman & Ralph W. Aigler eds., 3d ed. 2017). 
 154 EDWARD LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL 
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justifications for the attorney-client privilege sought to prevent attorneys 
from becoming “potential adversaries who could be pitted against the people 
they seek to serve.”155 
 During the eighteenth century, the focus shifted from attorneys’ interests 
in honor to clients’ interests in effective counsel.  As one judge put it: 
[T]he interest which [the client] has in this privilege, is very obvious.  No 
man can conduct any of his affairs which relate to matters of law, without 
employing and consulting with an attorney . . . and if he does not fully and 
candidly disclose every thing that is in his mind, which he apprehends may 
be in the least relative to the affair he consults his attorney upon, it will be 
impossible for the attorney properly to serve him . . . .156 
With this development arose the rule that the clients control the privilege, 
and only they (not their attorneys) can waive it. 157  
 Until the nineteenth century, attorney-client privilege applied to a 
relatively limited range of attorney-client communications—those providing 
advice in anticipation of litigation.158  In 1833, common law courts removed 
this restriction in one of the most important attorney-client privilege cases, 
Greenough v. Gaskell.159  The issue in Gaskell was whether a client could claim 
the privilege over accounts and letters prepared, dictated, or received by an 
attorney “in his character or situation of confidential solicitor to the 
[client].”160  The court opined that: 
[I]t does not appear that the protection is qualified by any reference to 
proceedings pending or in contemplation.  If touching matters that come 
within the ordinary scope of professional employment, they [attorneys] 
receive a communication . . . from a client . . . they are not only justified in 
withholding such matters, but bound to withhold them, and will not be 
compelled to disclose the information or produce the papers in any Court of 
law or equity, either as party or as witness.  If this protection were confined 
to cases where proceedings had commenced, the rule would exclude the 
most confidential, and it may be the most important of all 
communications—those made with a view of being prepared either for 
 
JURISPRUDENCE; CONSISTING OF SYSTEMS OF PENAL LAW FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA AND 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 461 (1873). 
 155 FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 145, § 5:13. 
 156 Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1139, 1237 (Ex. 1743).  
 157 Lord Say & Seal’s Case (1712) 88 Eng. Rep. 617, 617; 10 Mod. 40, 41 (“The Court were of opinion, 
that Holbeche’s case was good law; and that an attorney’s privilege was the privilege of his client . . . .”).  
 158 RICE ET AL., supra note 145, §§ 1:6–9.  Some historians have argued that the privilege only extended 
to barristers, but a close look at the cases reveals that communications with other attorneys were 
also privileged when they were in anticipation of litigation.  Barristers were simply the attorneys 
whose clients were most likely to communicate with in anticipation of litigation.  See id.; Berd v. 
Lovelace (1577) 21 Eng. Rep. 33, 33; Cary 62, 62. 
 159 (1833) 39 Eng. Rep. 618; 1 My. & K. 98. 
 160 Id. at 620. 
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instituting or defending a suit, up to the instant that the process of the Court 
issued.161 
This was the start of the expansive scope of the attorney-client privilege 
familiar today.  Thus, by 1873, a court could write:  
[I]t is not now necessary as it formerly was, for the purpose of obtaining 
production, that the communications should be made either during or 
relating to an action or even to an expected litigation.  It is sufficient if they 
pass as professional communications [with an attorney] in a professional 
capacity.162 
 American courts imported this law of attorney-client privilege from 
England with very little change.163  First recognized by the Supreme Court 
in 1826,164 the privilege has been employed to serve “broader public interests 
in the observance of law and administration of justice.”165  American courts 
tended to see the privilege in purely instrumental terms, as an essential 
“means to the end of promoting certain desirable social consequences.”166  
The privilege helps people stay informed about what the law requires of them 
by facilitating full and frank discussion between attorneys and the clients 
seeking their advice.  A client who cannot be sure that all statements to her 
attorney would be safe from discovery and exploitation by an opposing party 
may choose not to seek legal advice or not to disclose all important 
information.167  
 That instrumental rationale is still the prevailing justification for the 
attorney-client privilege today.168  Although the precise elements of the 
 
 161 Id.  
 162 Lawrence v. Campbell (1859) 62 Eng. Rep. 186, 188; 4 Drewry 485, 490. 
 163 See, e.g., Parker v. Carter, 18 Va. 273, 286 (1814) (“[C]ounsel and attornies ought not to be 
permitted to give evidence of facts imparted to them, by their clients, when acting in their 
professional character; that they are considered as identified with their clients, and, of necessity, 
entrusted with their secrets, which, therefore, without a dangerous breach of confidence, cannot be 
revealed; that this obligation of secrecy continues always, and is the privilege of the client, and not 
of the attorney.  The court is also of opinion, that this restriction is not confined to facts disclosed, 
in relation to suits actually depending at the time, but extends to all cases in which a client applies, 
as aforesaid, to his counsel or attorney, for his aid in the line of his profession.”).   
 164 See Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. 280, 294 (1826) (“The general rule is not disputed, that confidential 
communications between client and attorney, are not to be revealed at any time.”). 
 165 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 166 IMWINKELRIED & BARRETT, supra note 153, § 2.4, at 174–75; see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“[The 
privilege’s] purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their 
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration 
of justice.  The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that 
such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”). 
 167 FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 145, § 5:13.; IMWINKELRIED & BARRETT, supra note 153, § 2.4, at 
174–75. 
 168 FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 145, § 5:13. 
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attorney-client privilege vary among jurisdictions, Professor Wigmore’s  
definition is a common model: 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal 
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that 
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance 
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, 
(8) except the protection be waived.169 
Accordingly, the attorney-client relationship begins when a prospective client 
approaches an attorney with the intent of receiving the attorney’s services 
and legal advice.170  The privilege attaches to all initial interview 
communications before that point, regardless of whether representation is 
offered or declined, and then to all confidential communications once the 
offer for representation is accepted.171  Thus, as long as a client can provide 
sufficient evidence to meet each of the above elements the attorney-client 
privilege will apply.  Once the relationship is created, the duration of the 
privilege is indefinite, even lasting beyond a client’s death, unless it is waived 
beforehand.172    
B.  Confidentiality and Third Parties 
 Though the attorney-client privilege is often referred to as an “absolute” 
privilege, there are conditions in which courts will hold that the privilege, 
and its protections, have been waived.173  The focus of the waiver inquiry is 
the fourth element in Wigmore’s definition of the privilege—
confidentiality.174  If attorney-client communications lose their confidential 
 
 169 WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 554 (emphasis omitted). 
 170 RICE ET AL., supra note 145, § 2:4. 
 171 Id.  
 172 Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 406–07 (1998). 
 173 RICE ET AL., supra note 145, § 2:2. 
 174 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2292, at 554; see IMWINKELRIED & BARRETT, supra note 153, § 6.12.2, 
at 1155–56 (discussing that the burden of proof in waiver cases revolves around a privilege holder 
showing that the initial communication was confidential and that confidentiality has been 
maintained); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 327 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (“The 
confidentiality element and waiver are closely related inasmuch as any voluntary disclosure 
inconsistent with the confidential nature of the attorney client relationship waives the privilege.”).  
There are other ways clients can waive the privilege that do not implicate confidentiality.  For 
example, if a client asserts an advice of counsel defense in a criminal trial, or otherwise refers to the 
contents of attorney-client communications to disadvantage their opponents.  Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) (“A defendant may also waive the 
privilege by asserting reliance on the advice of counsel as an affirmative defense.” (citing cases)); see 
also BARBARA J. VAN ARSDALE ET AL., 81 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: WITNESSES § 329 (2d ed. 
2018), Westlaw (“[A] party waives the attorney-client privilege by placing the advice of counsel in 
issue only where the client asserts the claim or defense and attempts to prove that claim or defense 
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nature, they are no longer privileged. 
 The confidentiality requirement was an early American addition to the 
common law of attorney-client privilege.175  Over the course of the twentieth 
century, the confidentiality requirement became the majority rule in U.S. 
jurisdictions.176  The private-public interest balancing rationale behind the 
development is strikingly similar to the rationale behind the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.  The interest in encouraging clients 
to be forthcoming with their attorneys must be balanced against the interests 
adverse parties (including government authorities) have in gathering all 
available evidence.177  Clients who are unconcerned about confidentiality do 
not need the protections of the privilege to coax them to seek legal advice.178  
Consequently, in such cases the balance of interests tips in favor of 
evidentiary transparency, and against the privilege.   
 The standards courts use to measure confidentiality are also structurally 
reminiscent of Fourth Amendment doctrine.  Recall that the warrant 
requirement attaches to information in which a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, as measured by subjective and objective criteria.179  
Similarly, for an attorney-client communication to be considered 
confidential, the client must subjectively intend that the communications to 
the attorney are confidential, and such intent must be objectively reasonable 
under the circumstances.180  The communications must be confidential when 
first conveyed, and confidentiality must be maintained at all times 
afterwards.181 
 
by disclosing or describing an attorney-client communication . . . .”).  These modes of waiver serve 
as practical exceptions to the general rule that confidential attorney communications are privileged, 
because any other rule would unfairly allow parties to use the privilege “both as a sword and shield” 
against opposing parties.  Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., 745 F.3d 343, 
353 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Chevron Corp. v Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 175 RICE ET AL., supra note 145, at § 6:3.  Early U.S. cases held that attorneys could not be compelled 
to testify to non-confidential communications, though third parties aware of the communication 
could be.  Id. (citing Jackson v. French, 3 Wend. 337 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829)).  
 176 Id. 
 177 Charles W. Wolfram, The U.S. Law of Client Confidentiality: Framework for an International Perspective, 15 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 529, 544 (1991). 
 178 See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 
DUKE L.J. 853, 859 (1998) (explaining that “the protection of the privilege is not ‘necessary to 
secure the client’s subjective freedom of consultation’” when the client freely chooses to 
communicate in certain situations, such as when a third party is present (footnote omitted)). 
 179 See supra Section I.A. 
 180 RICE ET AL., supra note 145, § 6:1; see, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 843 F.2d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 
1988) (“The key, of course, to whether an attorney/client relationship existed is the intent of the 
client and whether he reasonably understood the conference to be confidential.” (emphasis added)). 
 181 See, e.g., United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1976) (“It is vital to a claim of privilege 
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 As with privacy under the Fourth Amendment, the concept of 
confidentiality in the law of privilege is best defined by its breach.  Clients 
are said to “waive” the privilege, whether intentionally or not, when they do 
something that compromises the confidentiality of the privileged 
information.  This is where the attorney-client privilege’s version of the third-
party doctrine comes in.  Disclosure of privileged information to a third party 
may182  “destroy[] both the communications’ confidentiality and the privilege 
that is premised upon it.”183  Courts reason that a client who allows third 
parties to overhear or otherwise access communications to her attorney 
cannot intend those communications to be confidential.184  Even 
unintentional disclosure to a third party may waive the privilege.185 
 Privilege waiver, however, differs in two crucial respects from the Fourth 
Amendment’s third-party doctrine that give the former a lighter, more 
nuanced touch.  To begin, the circle of third parties to whom information 
can be revealed without shedding its confidential character is much wider.186  
The only parties formally excepted from the third-party doctrine are 
instruments of state—a person’s reasonable expectation of Fourth 
Amendment privacy is not undermined if the third party is acting at the 
direction of the government.187  The law of privilege, however, must be 
different—its very existence is premised on the presence of a third party (the 
attorney).  It recognizes that there are many contexts where communications 
with third parties are confidential and many important relationships that 
would be undermined if evidentiary privileges did not apply, such as 
 
that the communication have been made and maintained in confidence.”).  
 182 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 US 383, 396 (1981) (“[T]he recognition of a privilege based 
on a confidential relationship . . . should be determined on a case-by-case basis.” (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 17 (1974)).  
 183 RICE ET AL., supra note 145, § 9:29 (citing United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 819 
(1984)). 
 184 Frank v. Morley’s Estate, 64 N.W. 577, 578 (Mich. 1895) (“The communication was not made in 
any confidence which excluded [another individual], . . . and under such circumstances the 
privilege does not exist.”). 
 185 Compare Dion Messer, To: Client@Workplace.com: Privilege at Risk?, 23 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & 
PRIVACY L. 75, 93–95 (2004) (discussing cases where inadvertent disclosure resulted in waiver), with 
FED. R. EVID. 502(b) (outlining circumstances where inadvertent disclosure in the federal setting 
will not result in waiver). 
 186 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 133 (2006). 
 187 See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
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spousal,188 medical,189 psychiatric,190 and confessional relationships.191  These 
relationships form a network of third parties linked by a commitment to 
confidentiality; they often require that information be shared between 
them.192   
 A person worrying about past misdeeds may need to tell her attorney 
and her priest the same stories.  A person’s legal troubles may be the source 
of her psychiatric angst.  And her spouse may be just as important a source 
of support and advice as her attorney during legal conflict.  Forcing a waiver 
of attorney-client privilege when a client shares attorney-client 
communications to third parties in these relationships would undermine not 
only the value those relationships offer, but also the attorney-client 
relationship.193  The law recognizes this fact and does not hold that disclosure 
of attorney-client communications to one’s spouse, doctor, psychiatrist, or 
priest undermines confidentiality.194  
 
 
 188 Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (“The basis of the immunity given to communications 
between husband and wife is the protection of marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the 
preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of 
justice which the privilege entails. . . . Communications between the spouses, privately made, are 
generally assumed to have been intended to be confidential, and hence they are privileged; but 
wherever a communication, because of its nature or the circumstances under which it was made, 
was obviously not intended to be confidential it is not a privileged communication.” (internal 
citations omitted)); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51–52 (1980) (recognizing the 
distinction between the privilege protecting spousal communications and rights regarding the 
spousal testimonial privilege in trials and eventually concluding that the witness spouse alone holds 
the testimonial privilege and may waive it in order to testify adversely to his or her spouse).  
 189 People v. Al-Kanani, 307 N.E.2d 43, 44 (N.Y. 1973) (noting that New York was the first state to 
statutorily recognize the physician-client privilege, which was not recognized at common law, 
because the privilege “protect[s] those who are required to consult physicians from the disclosure 
of secrets imparted to them, to protect the relationship of patient and physician and to prevent 
physicians from disclosing information which might result in humiliation, embarrassment, or 
disgrace to patients” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Steinberg v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 
188 N.E. 152, 153 (N.Y. 1933))). 
 190 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (“Like the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege is ‘rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust.’” 
(quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51)). 
 191 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (“The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose 
to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or 
thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return.”). 
 192 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) (noting that the purpose of 
recognizing a privilege, such as the attorney-client privilege, is based in the desire that important, 
“relevant information” is shared between the parties). 
 193 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (discussing the multiple types of privileges and value each provides to 
the one sharing information in confidence). 
 194 See supra notes 188–91 and accompanying text. 
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 Courts have widened the cadre of third-party confidants recognized by 
the attorney-client privilege even further to include members of the so-called 
“magic circle.”195  Common law courts recognized as long ago as the 
eighteenth century that there are certain third parties—like interpreters—
who are crucial to the provision of legal advice.196  If disclosure to these third 
parties breached confidentiality and resulted in privilege waiver, the 
attorney-client privilege itself would be compromised.  Accordingly, courts 
hold that members of this magic circle do not count as third parties for 
privilege waiver purposes.197  Today, members of the magic circle include 
language translators,198 data analysts,199 executive assistants,200 IT support,201 
photocopy services,202 necessary subject matter experts,203 and the like.  The 
magic circle is a circle of confidence. 
 Even divulging attorney-client communications to third parties outside 
of the magic circle and other privileged relationships will not necessarily 
result in waiver.  The cornerstone of the privilege-waiver analysis is the intent 
of parties and the reasonableness of their precaution to preserve 
 
 195 United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The privilege, it is said, is 
designed to protect confidentiality, so that any disclosure outside the magic circle is inconsistent 
with the privilege.”). 
 196 Du Barré v. Livette (1791) 170 Eng. Rep. 96, 97; Peake 108, 110–11. 
 197 See, e.g., Clay v. Williams, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 105, 122 (1811) (acknowledging that a privilege based 
on confidentiality between an attorney and his client extends “even to interpreters going between 
the attorney and his client”). 
 198 See, e.g., Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 240 F.R.D. 96, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting 
that communications with an attorney through an interpreter are protected by the attorney-client 
privilege as an exception to the principle that communications in the presence of a third party 
destroy confidentiality). 
 199 See, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1114 (D. Kan. 2006) (holding 
that an adverse impact analysis by an analyst was protected by the attorney-client privilege because 
the analysis data was gathered at the direction of counsel and the communications were made for 
the purpose of obtaining legal advice). 
 200 See, e.g., City & Cty. of S.F. v. Superior Court, 231 P.2d 26, 30 (Cal. 1951) (en banc) (noting that the 
attorney-client privilege extends to employees such as “the attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk 
regarding information of communications between attorney and client acquired in such capacities”). 
 201 See, e.g., Compulit v. Banctec, Inc., 177 F.R.D. 410, 412 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (holding “that a law 
firm does not waive its client’s privilege by contracting with an independent contractor” who 
provides computer-assisted litigation support when it is done “to provide a necessary service that 
the law firm feels it needs in order to effectively represent its clients”). 
 202 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he attorney-client privilege [would not] be lost if a law firm used an outside 
document copy service or hired an independent document copy service to copy privileged 
communications.”). 
 203 Symposium, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-Testifying Experts: Reestablishing the 
Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Protection, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 19, 22–
23 (1990) (explaining the circumstances in which courts extend the attorney-client privilege to 
experts because those experts do not have a recognized privilege or the circumstances prevent the 
privilege from otherwise applying). 
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confidentiality.204  Where the disclosure is inadvertent, “the relevant 
consideration is the intent of the defendants to maintain the confidentiality 
of the documents as manifested in the precautions they took.”205  
Accordingly, courts ask whether the party claiming the privilege “took 
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure” and, upon discovering it, “promptly 
took reasonable steps to rectify the error.”206  A typical sort of case involves 
parties who inadvertently produce privileged documents in response to a 
discovery request.207  Courts will inquire into the steps the party took before 
disclosure—e.g., conducting pre-production privilege review of the 
documents—and after—e.g., promptly requesting return of the documents 
upon learning of a mistake.208 
 Some waiver cases specifically address the knowing disclosure of 
attorney-client communications to third-parties who are not the direct 
recipients of the information, but merely aide its transmission.  These cases 
are most analogous to the central concern of this Article—how third-party 
service providers affect privacy under the Fourth Amendment.  In the 
privilege context, these third parties facilitate, have access to, store, or 
monitor communications that include attorney-client communications, such 
as cell-service providers, internet service providers, or employer-provided 
email systems.209  Courts have adapted the centuries-old law of attorney-
client privilege to modern contexts and technologies.210  The underlying 
 
 204 See Rice, supra note 178, at 853–55 (“In all formal definitions of the attorney-client privilege, whether 
employed in state or federal courts, the client or the attorney must communicate with the other in 
confidence, and subsequently that confidentiality must have been maintained.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 205 Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 260 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
 206 FED. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 207 See Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that privileged tapes 
were inadvertently shared during discovery); Transamerica Comput. Co. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. 
Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 647 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that the inadvertent disclosure in question 
occurred during accelerated discovery proceedings). 
 208 See Suburban Sew ‘N Sweep, Inc., 91 F.R.D. at 260–61. 
 209 See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Applicability of Privileges to Employees’ Personal E-mails: The Errors 
Caused by the Confusion Between Privilege Confidentiality and Other Notions of Privacy, 2014 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 1, 3–4 (discussing the status of the law regarding the applicability of the attorney-client 
privilege to emails that are subject to employer monitoring); Anne Klinefelter, When to Research Is to 
Reveal: The Growing Threat to Attorney and Client Confidentiality from Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
1, 29 (2011) (explaining how internet activity tracking conducted by websites, advertisers, and 
internet service providers may lead courts to find waiver of the privilege in some cases); Timothy 
Peterson, Cloudy with a Chance of Waiver: How Cloud Computing Complicates the Attorney-Client Privilege, 46 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 383, 396 (2012) (discussing how the law has not yet established rules 
governing attorney-client privilege and confidentiality and new technologies such as cloud 
computing, leading to risks of privileged material being disclosed to non-privileged third parties). 
 210 See JEROME G. SNIDER & HOWARD A. ELLINS, CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION § 2.08 (1999) (“[M]any important issues currently at the center of the privilege 
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doctrinal and normative framework of the attorney-client privilege has 
shown itself to be more adaptable than the much more recent privacy 
doctrines of the Fourth Amendment. 
 Once again, standards of reasonableness govern whether clients waive 
privilege by using third-party services to communicate with their attorneys.  
Accordingly, courts assess the matter on a case-by-case basis,211 and the 
balance can tip in either direction.212  In one common fact pattern, an 
employee in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc. used a work-issued device to 
send messages to her attorney over a private email account.213  The device 
utilized a program that captured a picture of every website the employee 
visited, and the employer had a device policy in place that granted it access 
to any records on its computers.214  The central concern for the court was 
whether the employee had a “reasonable expectation” of confidentiality in 
the emails despite the employer’s software and policy.215  The court balanced 
the employer’s access against several specific facts, including that the 
employee used her personal email account, over a web-based platform, and 
without storing her password on the device.216  These steps, in addition to 
 
discussion concern new technology.”); Mitchel L. Winick et al., Playing I Spy with Client Confidences: 
Confidentiality, Privilege and Electronic Communications, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2000) 
(“[E]ach modern technological advance has taken attorneys and their clients one step farther from 
the closed-door, personal interactions upon which the privilege was founded.  Accordingly, with 
each step, the legal profession has been confronted with challenges to the privilege.” (footnote 
omitted) (citing Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participation 
and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 331 (1998))). 
 211 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 710 (1987). 
 212 See In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. Derivative Litig., 81 A.3d 278, 287 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“Numerous 
courts have applied the Asia Global factors or closely similar variants when analyzing the attorney-
client privilege [waiver claims premised on the use of unencrypted email].  Several of the Asia Global 
factors have been refined through subsequent application.  In the current case, the Asia Global 
factors weigh in favor of production.”); Imwinkelried, supra note 209, at 10 (discussing the factors 
that determine whether the attorney-client privilege applies); see also Kara R. Williams, Protecting 
What You Thought Was Yours: Expanding Employee Privacy to Protect the Attorney-Client Privilege from Employer 
Computer Monitoring, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 356–58 (2008) (outlining different jurisdictions’ 
evaluation of attorney-client privilege and e-mails over employer-owned e-mail systems).  Compare 
Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs. v. Evans, No. 04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at *4 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 3, 2006) (finding that the attorney-client privilege did attach to e-mails sent over company 
system), with Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 443 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2007) 
(finding that the privilege did not attach to e-mails sent over the employer’s system). 
 213 990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010). 
 214 Id. at 655–57. 
 215 Id. at 660.  The court uses the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy.”  However, since the 
conception of privacy is different from the one at play in the Fourth Amendment context, it is 
clearer for present purposes to use “confidentiality,” the term more commonly associated with the 
attorney-client privilege. 
 216 Id. at 663–65. 
 
Dec. 2018] PRIVILEGING PRIVACY 519 
   
 
the fact that the employer’s device policy was not clearly communicated to 
employees, were sufficient to establish her expectation of confidentiality and 
to preserve the privilege of her attorney communications.217 
 As a general rule, the use of an unencrypted, third-party email service 
does not, by itself, suffice to waive attorney-client privilege.218  In In re Asia 
Global Crossing, a leading case on the matter, officers of a bankrupt 
corporation used the corporate e-mail system to communicate with their 
personal attorneys about their claims against their employer.219  The 
corporate trustees argued that the officers had waived their privilege on 
several grounds: e-mail carries an inherent risk of disclosure, the e-mail 
system was owned and run by the corporation, and the system policy 
prohibited its use for confidential communications.220  Following the stance 
of the American Bar Association and some state bar associations,221 the court 
held that “lawyers and clients may communicate confidential information 
through unencrypted e-mail with a reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality.”222  But, the court did acknowledge that some uses of 
employer email could result in waiver.  It said that four main factors bear on 
the analysis: 
(1) does the corporation maintain a policy banning personal or other 
objectionable use, (2) does the company monitor the use of the employee’s 
computer or e-mail, (3) do third parties have a right of access to the computer 
or e-mails, and (4) did the corporation notify the employee, or was the 
employee aware, of the use and monitoring policies?223  
The Asia Global court applied the factors and found “the use of the company's 
e-mail system d[id] not, without more, destroy the privilege.”224  Other courts 
have relied on the Asia Global factors to guide their waiver inquiry.225 
 The general rule is that clients can maintain their reasonable expectation 
of confidentiality, even when they know third-party facilitators may be 
 
 217 Id. at 664–65. 
 218 In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he transmission of 
a privileged communication through unencrypted e-mail does not, without more, destroy the 
privilege.”). 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 259–60. 
 221 Micah K. Story, Twenty-First Century Pillow-Talk: Applicability of the Marital Communications Privilege to 
Electronic Mail, 58 S.C. L. REV. 275, 295 (2006). 
 222 Asia Glob. Crossing, 322 B.R. at 256. 
 223 Id. at 257 (footnote omitted). 
 224 Id. at 251. 
 225 See, e.g., Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co., No. 2:11-CV-03577-RDP, 2016 WL 7745029, at 
*5 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 2, 2016); In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-2509-LHK-PSG, 
2013 WL 772668, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2013); In re Reserve Fund Secs. & Derivative Litig., 
275 F.R.D. 154, 159–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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looking on, by taking “affirmative steps to maintain the confidentiality of the 
attorney-client communications.”226  If the client does not take these steps, 
waiver will result.  In Harleysville Insurance Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., the 
court held that posting case files and communications to an online storage 
system without sufficient precautions to prevent access by a third party 
constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.227  Attorneys had posted 
the information to a file sharing site for use by Harleysville’s attorneys.228  In 
the course of explaining its decision, the court noted some easy precautions 
the attorneys could have taken to prevent waiver, such as password 
protecting the files229 or safeguarding the access link.230  As it was, the client 
had done “the cyber world equivalent of leaving [a] claims file on a bench in 
the public square and telling its counsel where they could find it.”231 
 Interestingly, courts that have analyzed privilege waiver in the context of 
third-party electronic service providers—like email and cloud storage—focus 
on the possibility of waiver due to access by yet other third parties—like 
employers or opposing counsel.  The third-party service providers usually 
seem to recede into the background, like people in other privileged 
relationships with the client or the “magic circle” that is necessary for 
facilitating attorney-client communication.  This cannot be because courts 
are only concerned with whether opposing parties could access the 
communications.  Unlike the work-product protection,232 disclosure to any 
third party potentially waives attorney-client privilege if the disclosure calls 
the confidentiality of the communication into question.233  Rather, it must be 
because courts do not regard the use of such service providers, which most 
 
 226 Geer v. Gilman Corp., No. 3:06 CV 889(JBA), 2007 WL 1423752, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2007). 
 227 Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15cv00057, 2017 WL 1041600, at *9 
(W.D. Va. Feb. 9), overruled in part by 2017 WL 4368617 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017). 
 228 Id. at *2. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. at *9.  The magistrate judge’s opinion in Harleyesville was eventually reversed by the reviewing district 
court judge.  Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home Inc., 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 4368617, 
at *19 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017) (finding reasonable precautions were taken in part because files 
uploaded to cloud server were accessible only using a randomly generated URL that was not 
discoverable using Google or other web search engines).  The contrasting opinions on the case illustrate 
both how judges will sometimes find that precautions to preserve confidentiality against third-party 
service providers are insufficient, and also how low the bar to preserve confidentiality can be. 
 232 See In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 165 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that disclosure to a third party 
waives the attorney-client privilege, but the work product privilege is only waived if disclosure is to 
an adversary).  The work-product protection is a weaker privilege.  See United States v. Nobles, 422 
U.S. 225, 239 (1975) (stating that the work-product privilege is “not absolute”).  It applies only to 
documents prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation.  Id. at 238. 
 233 Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d at 165. 
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attorneys and clients need to communicate at all, to be inherently 
inconsistent with the confidentiality of those communications. 
 In sum, the notion of privacy courts use in the context of the attorney-
client privilege reflects an intuitive understanding of privacy as a form of 
confidentiality.  “Confidence” has its roots in the Middle French and Latin 
words meaning “trust.”234  Confidence and trust have a different 
informational logic than the sort of secrecy which is the current lynchpin of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Like secrecy, confidentiality can be lost 
when third parties get involved.  Sharing information with third parties can 
signal that it is not shared under conditions of mutual trust.  But unlike 
secrets, confidential information does not necessarily become less 
confidential when shared.  One can have a reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality with another person; but there is something paradoxical about 
insisting what you tell another is truly secret.  To determine whether 
attorney-client communications remain confidential despite disclosure to 
third parties, courts ask whether the client had subjective and objective 
expectations of confidentiality.  The latter is measured by whether the client 
took reasonable precautions to maintain the confidential nature of the 
communication.    
III.  REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
 Privacy is at the heart of Fourth Amendment law.  There are multiple, 
overlapping ways to understand what privacy is.  Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and the common law of attorney-client privilege offer 
competing conceptions.  Both recognize that sharing information can 
compromise its privacy.  However, under the Fourth Amendment’s 
understanding of privacy-as-secrecy, the fact that information has been 
shared is usually dispositive of its lost privacy.  Privacy-as-confidentiality in 
the law of attorney-client-privilege is more nuanced—with appropriate 
precautions, information can remain confidential even if third parties have 
access to it.   
 The Supreme Court should abandon its understanding of privacy as a 
type of secrecy and import the common law understanding of privacy-as-
confidentiality.  This would allow the Court to strike a more appropriate 
balance between the interests of investigating authorities and the interests of 
the people in their personal data.  Thinking of privacy-as-confidentiality 
under the Fourth Amendment would soften the force of the third-party 
doctrine where third-party service providers are involved.  Under current 
 
 234 See Confide, THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY (T.F. Hoad ed., 1996). 
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law, the Fourth Amendment does not protect what is quickly becoming the 
bulk of our intimate information because third-party service providers—like 
cell companies and ISPs—have access to it.  Thinking of privacy as 
confidentiality could change this.  The move should be easy for the Court to 
make since the attorney-client privilege is backed by centuries of judicial 
refinement and application to a wide range of cases.  It should also not 
require a large shift in core Fourth Amendment jurisprudence outside of the 
third-party service provider context.  Secret information is by its nature also 
confidential.  So key Fourth Amendment rights would remain in place.  
These rights would just extend under this proposal in a more sensible way to 
a modern world held together by third parties. 
 Most of the Justices in Carpenter, in both the majority and dissent, were 
searching for conceptual tools to convey that “a third party [having] access 
or possession of your papers and effects does not necessarily eliminate your 
interest in them.”235  Doing this by shifting to a conception of privacy as 
confidentiality has several distinct advantages over the proposal they hit 
upon.  The majority’s solution—carving seven-day blocks of cell-site location 
information out for special treatment—is an ad hoc solution.  As Justice 
Gorsuch asks, “[W]hat distinguishes historical data from real-time data, or 
seven days of a single person’s data from a download of everyone’s data over 
some indefinite period of time?”236  Justice Kennedy felt similarly, referring 
to the “arbitrary 6-day cutoff.”237   
 In addition to being ad hoc, the majority’s approach does not go far 
enough to explain why “[j]ust because you entrust your data . . . to a third 
party may not mean you lose any Fourth Amendment interest in its 
contents.”238  Justice Gorsuch makes the intuitive point: 
Suppose I entrust a friend with a letter and he promises to keep it secret until 
he delivers it to an intended recipient.  In what sense have I agreed to bear 
the risk that he will turn around, break his promise, and spill its contents to 
someone else?  More confusing still, what have I done to manifest my 
willingness to accept the risk that the government will pry the document 
from my friend and read it without his consent?239 
The precedent established by the Carpenter majority does not protect Fourth 
Amendment interests in any other information people reveal to third party 
 
 235 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2268 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); id. at 2221 
(majority opinion) (“[T]hird parties . . . [hold] records in which the suspect has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”) 
 236 Id. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 237 Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 238 Id. at 2269 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 239 Id. at 2263 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 
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service providers, like six-day blocks of location information, emails, 
genomes, photos, etc.  Conceiving of privacy as confidentiality would. 
 To the extent the majority means for its opinion to reach beyond seven-
day blocks of cell-site location information,240 it provides very uncertain 
guidance.  The Court says the distinctive properties of cell-site location 
information deserve Fourth Amendment protection, but fail to say clearly 
what those distinctive properties are.241  Justice Kennedy predicts that the 
“newly conceived constitutional standard will cause confusion” among lower 
courts and enforcement personnel.242  In his view, the Court has effectively 
set up an unprincipled “balancing test . . . . [that just asks when] privacy 
interests are weighty enough to ‘overcome’ the third-party disclosure.”243  
Without more guidance on how, if at all, to extend the Carpenter precedent to 
different types of information, Justice Kennedy must be right.  The solution 
proposed here is different.  Since it draws on centuries of attorney-privilege 
precedent, it offers a more robust framework for assessing a broad range of 
information types and contexts. 
 The next two Sections describe in more detail what the Fourth 
Amendment inquiry into reasonable expectations of privacy-as-
confidentiality would look like. 
A.  An Open-Textured Inquiry 
 On the approach proposed here, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement protects personal information when, and only when, a person 
has a reasonable expectation of confidentiality in it.  As under current Fourth 
Amendment244 and attorney-client privilege245 case law, the confidentiality 
inquiry would have both subjective and objective components.  What follows 
explores these components where third-party service providers are involved.  
Though not a focus of the discussion, the considerations raised below could 
extend to other sorts of third parties, including natural persons.   
 
 240 Id. at 2214 (majority opinion) (“[W]e reject[ ] . . . a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment.” (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). 
 241 Id. at 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court maintains, cell-site records are ‘unique’ . . . .  
But many other kinds of business records [are similar]. . . .”). 
 242 Id. at 2230. 
 243 Id. at 2231–32. 
 244 See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text. 
 245 See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Subjective Expectation 
 Courts should first ask whether a person claiming Fourth Amendment 
protections had a subjective expectation that her information was and would 
be kept confidential.  As under current Fourth Amendment law, this could 
mean that the person actually thought that the information was and would 
be kept secret.246  But a subjective expectation of confidentiality could remain 
even where the person has voluntarily shared it with a third party and so 
knows the information is not secret.  These sorts of cases could potentially 
fall into three categories, all of them recognized by privilege law. 
 First, the person may feel she is in a relationship of trust with the third party.  
Mutual trust is crucial to the analysis in attorney-client privilege contexts 
where third parties are involved.247  People trust those with whom they are 
in confidential relationships not to disclose their information in ways that 
would disadvantage them.  This does not necessarily mean that people expect 
their trusted third parties to keep their information secret.  Sometimes, as 
with an attorney’s magic circle, the third party must disclose the information 
to fourth and fifth parties for the ultimate benefit of the person whose 
information it is.  This is an expected feature of confidential (as opposed to 
secretive) relationships.  However, a subjective expectation of confidentiality 
could not exist where the information holder believes there is some likelihood 
the third party (e.g., an attorney or a service provider) may expose the 
information to her disadvantage (e.g., to her adversary or to government 
investigators without a warrant). 
 Courts have formally recognized that some sorts of relationships are 
presumptively confidential in this way, like the spousal relationship or the 
confessional relationship.248  But subjective expectations of trust and 
confidentiality can extend beyond these.  People may even feel that they have 
such relationships with corporate third-party service providers.249  Indeed 
such companies often invest a lot into cultivating customer trust and 
 
 246 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that monitoring a person’s home 
with thermal imaging technology was a search under the Fourth Amendment because the 
defendant had a reasonably expectation of privacy, secrecy, in his conduct in his own home). 
 247 See Mark J. Kadish, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Can It Stand Its Ground Against New Government Intrusions?, 
36 EMORY L.J. 793, 793 (1987) (describing mutual trust as one of the cornerstones of the attorney-
client privilege).  
 248 See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text. 
 249 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that in many 
circumstances, the fact that an internet service provider has control over and access to emails is 
alone insufficient to eliminate a person’s expectation of privacy in those emails). 
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reputations for discretion.250  Facebook offers “privacy” settings, which can 
make us feel that they respect the confidentiality of the personal information 
we protect using them.251  Apple publicly resists federal government pressure 
to unlock the iPhones of criminal suspects252 in an effort to give the 
impression that the company respects privacy.253  Whether it is reasonable 
for customers to buy into these marketing campaigns is a separate question.  
That customers frequently do is clear from companies’ continued 
investment. 
 Second, a person may have a subjective expectation of confidentiality 
while utilizing a third-party service provider because she may not know that the 
third-party service provider has access to her information.  Third-party service 
providers design their products to minimize our awareness that at each 
moment they are collecting, storing, and processing our information.254  
They do this in part because they want clean information about our habits 
and preferences, and people who feel they are being observed modify their 
behavior.255  The information from our web searches, product purchases, 
geolocation, etc., is less valuable to advertisers when it is not authentic.256  So 
 
 250 See JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION: HOW INTEGRITY HAS 
BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET 8 (2013) (“Firms invest in reputation so that customers will 
do business with them.  Rational customers prefer to do business with companies with good 
reputations because a strong reputation for honesty and integrity serves as a sort of bond, or credible 
promise to customers that the business will not act in a dishonest or immoral way. . . . [A]ccording 
to the traditional economic theory of reputation, simple cost-benefit analysis predicts that 
companies will invest in reputation because doing so enables them to attract customers who will 
pay a premium to deal with the company with the good reputation.”). 
 251 See Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/325807937506242 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2018). 
 252 See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to San Bernardino 
Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-used-by-san-bernardino-shooter/2016/02/16/ 
69b903ee-d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html. 
 253 Id. (reporting that Apple refused to create a “backdoor” to its iPhone’s programming because of the 
threat it posed to all its customers’ devices in the future). 
 254 See, e.g., Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 
1434–35 (“[W]e adore Google for its simple, modest-looking interface masking a hyper-
complicated algorithm.  We admire it for providing superb services at no (evident) cost . . . . [But] 
[e]very day, millions of users provide Google with unfettered access to their interests, needs, desires, 
fears, pleasures, and intentions.  Many users do not realize that this information is logged and 
maintained in a form which can facilitate their identification.”). 
 255 See, e.g., Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-World Setting, 2 
BIOLOGY LETTERS 412, 412 (2006) (reporting that people contributed nearly three times as much 
money to a coffee room honesty box when a picture of eyes was present on a nearby wall than when 
a picture without eyes was on the wall). 
 256 See Natasha Singer, Your Online Attention, Bought in an Instant, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/technology/your-online-attention-bought-in-an-instant-
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third-party service providers try to make us feel that we truly are by ourselves 
when we are on our smartphones late at night.257  As discussed above, there 
are in fact any number of trackers operating behind the scenes watching our 
digital trails.258  As courts have repeatedly held in the attorney-client privilege 
context, a person who is not aware that others are accessing her information 
can have no reason to doubt its confidentiality.259   
 The third sort of case is subtler—where a person knows she is sharing 
information with a third-party service provider, even one she does not trust, 
but believes it is practically certain that the information is not identifiable as her personal 
information.  This is a safety-in-numbers sort of rationale.  In many 
circumstances, customers will have agreed to let third-party service providers 
access and use their information, even though they do not necessarily feel 
that they are in a relationship of trust with the company.  By clicking “I 
Agree” before installing a smartphone app, downloading a new browser, or 
signing up for internet service, customers usually grant the service provider 
access to their information.260  Sometimes people do not read or understand 
 
by-advertisers.html (discussing how online advertising has moved away from traditional forms of 
“spray and pray” advertising to using complex algorithms that instantly analyze an internet user’s 
search and website history and instantaneously sell advertising space targeted at the specific 
searcher). 
 257 See generally Hidden Brain: What Our Google Searches Reveal About Who We Really Are, NPR (May 1, 2017, 
9:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/01/526399881/what-our-google-searches-reveal-
about-who-we-really-are. 
 258 See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text. 
 259 See Sackman v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 173 F.R.D. 358, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that attorney-client 
privilege was “not waived through public disclosure of a stolen privileged document”); see also In re 
Fattah, 802 F.3d 516, 530 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that the government had to revise its search process 
of an email account in order to protect communications falling under the attorney-client privilege 
even though the emails were being provided directly from a third-party service provider); Curto v. 
Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 15, 2006) (holding that attorney-client privilege was not waived when an employer recovered 
emails from a company computer that was used at the employee’s home because the employee had 
a reasonable expectation that personal communications on that computer were not monitored). 
 260 See James P. Nehf, Incomparability and the Passive Virtues of Ad Hoc Privacy Policy, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1, 15 (2005) (“Many [companies] voluntarily publish privacy policies, but there is no law requiring 
privacy policies or prescribing their content.” (footnote omitted)).  There are both federal and state 
laws that require a company to post a privacy policy in certain circumstances, but no general law 
requiring a policy in every circumstance.  See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(a) (2012) (requiring websites 
directed at children to “[p]rovide notice on the website or online service of what information it 
collects from children, how it uses such information, and its disclosure practices for such 
information”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575(a)–22578 (West 2014) (requiring operators of 
commercial websites or online services that collect personal information about individual 
consumers residing in California who use or visit its commercial website or online service to 
“conspicuously post its privacy policy on its Web site”). 
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the policies they are agreeing to.261  These scenarios would be examples of 
the second type of case.   
 Sometimes, though, people do read privacy policies, fully understand 
them, click “I Agree,” and still retain a subjective expectation of 
confidentiality.  The most obvious sorts of cases would be where the third-
party service actually requires this information to function.  People have to 
disclose their location to use mapping services like Google Maps.  Though 
they share this sort of information with third-party service providers, they 
could believe that their information will be used consistently with its 
confidentiality.  Third-party service providers often emphasize that the data 
they collect is anonymous, stripped of any personally identifying 
information.262  People reading such policies often feel that their anonymous 
data will be just so many bits in a sea of bytes for millions of other accounts.263  
The customer may feel practically certain that neither the third-party service 
provider nor anyone else with access to her information would have the 
ability to collect her data and tie it specifically to her.  Practical certainty is 
 
 261 Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal Information?, 111 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 587, 588 (2007) (“[M]ost studies show that, while consumers are increasingly concerned 
about the privacy of their personal information, they are still not likely to read—much less 
understand—online privacy policies.” (footnote omitted)). 
 262 See, e.g., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting 
that the defendant company included a message that said, “HEY GROWN-UPS: We don’t collect 
ANY personal information about your kids.  Which means we couldn’t share it even if we wanted 
to!” on the registration form for a website designed for children). 
 263 See Simon Hill, How Much Do Online Advertisers Really Know About You?  We Asked an Expert, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (June 27, 2015, 3:00 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/how-do-
advertisers-track-you-online-we-found-out (“We know that companies are collecting data about us, 
but there’s very little transparency in terms of the techniques they use, and there are a lot of 
misconceptions.  [People] don’t really know exactly what data [online trackers] are collecting, or 
what they might use it for.”); Special Report: Getting to Know You, ECONOMIST (Sept. 11, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21615871-everything-people-do-online-
avidly-followed-advertisers-and-third-party (“As more information is attached to cookies and 
devices, it becomes easier to identify users, says Ed Felten, a professor of computer science at 
Princeton University.  Mr[.] Felten and others have shown that, given enough information, 
anonymous data sets can be de-anonymised.  One study found that it took only two data points to 
identify more than half the users.  ‘The idea of personally identifiable information not being 
identifiable is completely laughable in computer-science circles,’ says Jonathan Mayer, a Stanford 
University computer-science researcher.”); Manoush Zomorodi, Do You Know How Much Private 
Information You Give Away Every Day?, TIME (Mar. 29, 2017), http://time.com/4673602/terms-
service-privacy-security (describing the “privacy paradox,” in which most people say they care 
deeply about the privacy of their information yet continue to freely give it and allow it to be tracked 
online because they see no clear future consequences of giving up the information or figure that 
algorithms cannot do as much as they actually can); see also Tene, supra note 254, at 1435 (“Every 
day, millions of users provide Google with unfettered access to their interests, needs, desires, fears, 
pleasures, and intentions.  Many users do not realize that this information is logged and maintained 
in a form which can facilitate their identification.”). 
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not full certainty, but it may be enough for maintaining a subjective 
expectation of confidentiality.   
 If someone shredded an attorney-client communication and cast the 
pieces to the wind, courts would find this consistent with maintaining a 
subjective expectation of confidentiality, despite the remote possibility that 
another person may collect the bits and reconstruct the communique.264  
Courts have held that a subjective expectation of confidentiality can survive 
much lower levels of certainty.  For example, an employee sending email 
over a company device may have a subjective expectation of confidentiality 
despite explicit company policy to the contrary if the company’s practices 
“‘lull[ed]’ employees into believing that the policy would not be enforced.”265  
Where the third party is an email provider rather than an employer, courts 
are even more likely to find the messages could have been sent with a 
subjective expectation of confidentiality,266 despite the risk of exposure.  
2.  Objective Reasonableness 
 The three sorts of cases just considered only bear on whether a person 
can have a subjective expectation of confidentiality when interacting with a 
third-party service provider.  Assuming the court finds she does, it should 
next ask whether that expectation was objectively reasonable.  The Supreme 
Court currently takes a more or less categorical approach to assessing 
whether expectations of privacy are reasonable.  The third-party doctrine 
categorically excludes any reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
shared with third parties.  In the absence of a third-party issue, the Court 
recognizes categories of information over which people’s expectations of 
privacy are presumptively reasonable, such as information contained in 
 
 264 See McCafferty’s, Inc. v. Bank of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 168 (D. Md. 1998) (suggesting that 
shredding privileged documents, as opposed to solely discarding them, would maintain the 
documents’ confidentiality). 
 265 Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006).  
 266 See Sims v. Lakeside Sch., No. C06-1412RSM, 2007 WL 2745367, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 20, 
2007) (contrasting employer monitoring with email client monitoring); see also United States v. 
Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in emails 
sent through AOL because AOL had strict privacy guidelines under which it would only disclose a 
client’s emails to a third party if required by court order). 
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private residences,267 hotel rooms,268 many areas of commercial premises,269 
and private areas in public places such as restrooms and fitting rooms.270 
 Assessing the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy-as-
confidentiality calls for a more fact-intensive, open-textured inquiry.  This is 
usually how reasonableness judgments are supposed to work.271  It is the sort 
of inquiry that courts making privilege-waiver determinations use.272  The 
basic issue is not whether the information fits into some predetermined 
category or whether it has been shared.  Rather, the underlying issue is 
whether the person claiming the privilege took reasonable steps, in light of 
the nature of the information and the circumstances, to preserve 
confidentiality.  This requires courts to engage in a subtle balancing of the 
facts in any particular case to reach an all-things-considered judgment. 
 When third-party service providers are involved, courts assessing Fourth 
Amendment protections would first have to determine what level of attention 
to preserving confidentiality the circumstances called for.  Some features of 
the circumstance would call for higher levels of care and others may call for 
lower.  It would be impossible to list all possible considerations ex ante, but 
attorney-client privilege case law provides some representative factors.  
Courts have held that the following circumstances suggest that more care is 
needed to preserve confidentiality where third-party service providers are 
concerned: 
 
 267 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“The Fourth Amendment, and the personal 
rights which it secures, have a long history.  At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat 
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”). 
 268 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (“[A] guest in a hotel room is entitled to 
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 269 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) (“The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, 
has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his 
private commercial property.  The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the 
decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the 
inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by warrant.”). 
 270 See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800, 803 (Minn. 1970) (finding a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a public restroom because, referencing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), “the 
facilities provided assure the user of privacy as much as a telephone booth does”). 
 271 See Bonivert v. City of Clarkston, 883 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating that the test for 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment “is inevitably a fact-intensive inquiry”); Jason M. 
Solomon, Juries, Social Norms, and Civil Justice, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2014) (explaining how 
questions in law often come to questions of reasonableness and that questions of reasonableness are 
fact-intensive). 
 272 See, e.g., Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1484 (8th Cir. 1996) (adopting in a case regarding 
inadvertent disclosure of privileged communications a test that looks to the reasonableness of the 
precautions undertaken by the privilege holder to prevent a loss of confidentiality in the privileged 
documents). 
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• Electronic service monitoring policies, especially for employer-
provided services;273 
• Using devices provided by third parties, especially through 
employers;274 
• Ability of a device on its own to inadvertently disclose 
communications;275 
• Whether communications travel through public as opposed to 
private routes;276 
• The number and types of individuals who have access to 
information that is stored with a third-party service provider;277 
and 
• Whether the third-party service is a sharing service.278 
 
 
 
 
 
 273 See In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (adopting a four-part 
test that focuses primarily on questions regarding the extent to which the party providing an 
internet-based service has adopted policies regarding the privacy of those who use its service). 
 274 See, e.g., Sims v. Lakeside Sch., No. C06-1412RSM, 2007 WL 2745367, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 
20, 2007) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy when a plaintiff used an employer-provided 
email account on an employer-provided laptop). 
275 See, e.g., Huff v. Spaw, 794 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in communications over a cell phone was lost when the confidential information was 
conveyed inadvertently through a “pocket-dial”).  “In sum, a person who knowingly operates a 
device that is capable of inadvertently exposing his conversations to third-party listeners and fails 
to take simple precautions to prevent such exposure does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy with respect to statements that are exposed to an outsider by the inadvertent operation of 
that device.”  Id. 
 276 See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (noting that emails sent through 
AOL carried a higher expectation of privacy than messages sent in other ways over the internet 
because the AOL emails were transferred through and stored on AOL’s servers and databases as 
opposed to passing through normal internet servers). 
 277 See, e.g., Willis v. Willis, 914 N.Y.S.2d 243, 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (holding that although emails 
with an attorney were sent over a private email account, the fact that the plaintiff’s children knew 
the password to her account and frequently used the account for their own purposes removed her 
expectation of privacy).  But see Geer v. Gilman Corp., No. 3:06 CV 889(JBA), 2007 WL 1423752, 
at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2007) (noting that although the plaintiff used her fiancé’s computer and 
email account to communicate with her attorney, the relationship between them was sufficiently 
close and analogous to an agency relationship that confidentiality was not waived).  
 278 See, e.g., United States v. Pirosko, 787 F.3d 358, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding no reasonable 
expectation of privacy to a file that was shared); see also Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral 
Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 4368617, at *7 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017) (finding that 
reasonable precautions had been undertaken, despite the fact that the information was stored on a 
cloud sharing service and had been inadvertently disclosed). 
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 These factors should be balanced against others that have been held to 
lower the level of required care: 
• Non-enforcement or unclear presentation of monitoring 
policies;279 
• Presence of user-controlled privacy settings;280 
• Ability to set passwords on private services;281 and 
• Contractual obligations of privacy between customer and third-
party service provider.282 
 After the court has considered the circumstantial factors bearing on the 
level of care needed to preserve a reasonable expectation of confidentiality, 
it would assess whether the person with an interest in the information took 
appropriate steps.  Once again, attorney-client privilege case law suggests 
representative steps that a person could take in the presence of third-party 
service providers to preserve the confidentiality of their information: 
• Using and not disclosing passwords;283 
• Adjusting privacy settings;284 
• Using private services as opposed to those provided by another 
party, such as an employer;285 
 
 
 279 See Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327 (DRH)(MLO), 2006 WL 1318387, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) (evaluating whether an existing monitoring policy was being truly enforced 
in determining whether confidentiality existed); In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 259 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that the company neither announced nor effectuated a policy of email 
monitoring or announcing that emails over a company email belonged to the company); Nat’l Econ. 
Research Assocs., Inc. v. Evans, No. 04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 
3, 2006) (affirming that attorney-client privilege existed despite an employer policy regarding 
monitoring because the policy did not expressly state that messages sent over the internet through 
personal email accounts on an employer-provided computer would be saved and monitored). 
 280 See, e.g., Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 990 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing 
the role that privacy settings play in determining an expectation of privacy). 
 281 See United States v. Nunez, No. 12 Cr. 778-2, 2013 WL 4407069, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013) 
(holding that attorney-client privilege was not waived in emails sent through Gmail account because 
the account was private and protected by a password that was not disclosed to third parties). 
 282 See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (noting that AOL’s contractual 
obligation of privacy with its clients created a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 283 See, e.g., United States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that an employee 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy because he locked his offices and secured his computer 
with a password). 
 284 See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (remanding the question of an expectation of privacy in Facebook 
wall posts to the lower court with instructions to look to the plaintiff’s privacy settings because “it 
appear[ed] . . . that a review of plaintiff’s privacy settings would definitively settle the question”). 
 285 See, e.g., Sims v. Lakeside Sch., No. C06-1412RSM, 2007 WL 2745367, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 
20, 2007) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in emails sent on an employer-provided 
laptop through personal email account, but not for confidential emails through an employer-
provided email account). 
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• Deleting cookies and other online tracking mechanisms;286 and 
• Using encryption.287 
 These steps should be considered along with things a person may have 
done that would undermine the reasonableness of her expectation of 
confidentiality, such as: 
• Storing the password in a place accessible to others;288 
• Sharing passwords or accounts with others;289 and 
• Failing to delete information present on devices owned by a third 
party.290 
 The significance of any particular factor or step would be hard to predict 
in the abstract.  Where the circumstances indicate a high threat to 
confidentiality—e.g., an email provider with a transparent policy of sharing 
user data—and the steps taken to preserve privacy are weak—e.g., failing to 
protect a user account with a password—the outcome under the privacy-as-
confidentiality approach would likely be the same as under current Fourth 
Amendment law.  However, where the threat to confidentiality is weak—
e.g., an email provider with a protective privacy policy—and the steps taken 
are robust—e.g., using encryption services—thinking of privacy-as-
confidentiality could lead to a different result.  It would allow courts to 
recognize that in these cases, people still have the sorts of privacy interests 
the Fourth Amendment should be protecting despite the presence of a third-
party service provider. 
 Between those two poles is a wide grey space that calls for judgment in 
light of specific facts.  The next Section illustrates what that inquiry might 
look like. 
 
 286 See Anne Klinefelter, When to Research Is to Reveal: The Growing Threat to Attorney and Client Confidentiality 
from Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 29 (2011) (“[A]n attorney might be protected against a 
finding of waiver if she took reasonable precautions to avoid online research tracking, such as 
adjusting the settings on her internet browser software to prevent third-party cookies, using 
encryption to avoid deep packet inspection where possible, and adding software to the browser to 
prevent tracking by web bugs.” (footnote omitted)). 
 287 See id. 
 288 See Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (warning that leaving a password stored on another’s computer may be a factor that can lead 
to losing confidentiality because it gives another access to private communications).  
 289 See, e.g., Willis v. Willis, 914 N.Y.S.2d 243, 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (finding no expectation of 
privacy where a password for a personal email account was shared with children who regularly 
used the same account). 
 290 See Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 565. 
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B.  Test Case: Carpenter v. United States 
 Change may be in the air.  The Supreme Court has signaled in Carpenter 
its interest in paring back the current scope of the third-party doctrine.291  
The case was on appeal from the Sixth Circuit and asked whether people 
have protected Fourth Amendment interests in location data collected by cell 
service providers.292  The Supreme Court made a surgical exception for such 
location data when the government seeks more than seven days’ worth.293  
This Article has argued that the decision did not go far enough.  Conceiving 
of privacy as confidentiality offers a path for reaching the same intuitively 
appealing result in Carpenter while providing a theoretically justifiable 
template for future applications. 
 Petitioner Timothy Carpenter was convicted for leading a team of fifteen 
other men in several armed robberies.294  Carpenter’s role was to plan the 
robberies and drive the getaway car.295  Crucial to the government’s case 
against him was cell-site data the FBI had obtained from MetroPCS and T-
Mobile, Carpenter’s wireless carriers.296  When turned on, cell phones 
continuously search for and ping the nearest cell towers to route any calls.297  
Wireless carriers record the time and location of the cell towers to which 
individual phones connect.298  The FBI obtained the cell-site data using the 
Stored Communications Act, which authorizes courts to grant orders for 
telecommunications records.299  The Act requires investigators to provide 
“reasonable grounds to believe that . . . [the data sought] are relevant and 
material to an ongoing investigation.”300  With Carpenter’s cell-site data in 
hand cataloguing nearly 13,000 location points,301 the FBI could place him 
within a half-mile to two-mile distance of each of the robberies when they 
 
 291 See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (holding that police must obtain a 
warrant to access cell-site location records). 
 292 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016) (“In sum, we hold that the 
government’s collection of business records containing cell-site data was not a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.”), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
293 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3.  
 294 Id. at 2212.   
 295 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884–85. 
 296 Id. at 885. 
 297 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12; see also Kristi Winner, From Historical Cell-Site Location Information to 
IMSI-Catchers: Why TriggerFish Devices Do Not Trigger Fourth Amendment Protection, 68 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 243, 246–47 (2017) (arguing that cell-site location information does not protect a user’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy).   
298 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12; Winner, supra note 297, at 244.   
299 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
300 Id. 
301 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.   
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occurred.302 
 Carpenter challenged the government’s use of the cell-site data under 
the Fourth Amendment.  If Fourth Amendment protections applied, the FBI 
would have needed a warrant before getting the information.  This would 
have required a showing of “probable cause,”303 considerably more than the 
“reasonable grounds” standard in the Stored Communications Act.304  The 
trial court and the Sixth Circuit rejected Carpenter’s arguments.  The Sixth 
Circuit focused on the fact that the cell-site data contained only “routing 
information” necessary to “facilitate [Carpenter’s] personal 
communications,” not the “content of those communications themselves.”305  
The court’s underlying rationale was the third-party doctrine.  Like envelope 
information that the post office needs to deliver a letter306 or the phone 
number a telephone company needs to connect a call,307 wireless providers 
need location information to provide their service.   
 The Sixth Circuit relied heavily on a foundational third-party doctrine 
case, Smith v. Maryland.308  Smith held that, since the petitioner “voluntarily 
conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ 
that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business,” he 
could have no expectation of its privacy.309  The Sixth Circuit reasoned 
analogously that Carpenter voluntarily exposed his location information to 
third-party wireless carriers.  Consequently, under the present understanding 
of privacy as a kind of secrecy, Carpenter could have no reasonable 
expectation of the information’s privacy.310 
 The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion in Carpenter feels incongruous with the 
Fourth Amendment’s underlying concern for privacy.  Carpenter’s location 
may not have been secret—his wireless providers knew it.  Yet it could reveal 
many things about him that are intuitively private—the therapist he sees, the 
 
302 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 885 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
303 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
304 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (“That showing [required under the Stored Communications Act] 
falls well short of the probable cause required for a warrant.”); Erik E. Hawkins, No Warrants Shall 
Issue but upon Probable Cause: The Impact of the Stored Communications Act on Privacy Expectations, 4 WAKE 
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 257, 257 (2014) (stating that the Stored Communications Act allows the 
government to obtain personal information at “a lower standard than probable cause”). 
305 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 887. 
306 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877). 
307 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979). 
308 See id.; Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888. 
 309 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. 
 310 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888 (“[F]or the same reasons that Smith had no expectation of privacy in the 
numerical information at issue there, the defendants have no such expectation in the locational 
information here.”). 
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lovers he has, the faith he professes, the entertainment he prefers, etc.311  
Judge Stranch saw this, but her hands were tied by the third-party doctrine 
and the Supreme Court’s understanding of privacy-as-secrecy. 
 As we know, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit decision by 
making an arbitrary exception to the third-party doctrine for seven-day 
blocks of cell-site data.  It might have reached the same result—the officers 
investigating Carpenter needed a warrant—in a more principled way were 
Fourth Amendment privacy construed as confidentiality.  The questions for 
the Court would have been whether, despite sharing his location information 
with his wireless carriers, Carpenter nonetheless maintained a subjective and 
reasonable expectation that the information was confidential.  There can be 
no question of this for secrecy—a shared secret is no longer secret.  For 
confidentiality, though, the matter is not so categorical.  A court would have 
to consider in detail factual circumstances that might undermine an 
expectation of confidentiality and responsive conduct that may have 
maintained it. 
 The first issue is whether Carpenter had a subjective expectation of 
confidentiality.  The fact that his phone shared his cell-site data with his 
wireless carriers certainly cuts against Carpenter, but not decisively.  Recall 
that there are three sorts of cases where a person may maintain a subjective 
expectation of confidentiality despite sharing information with a third 
party—she is in a relationship of trust with the third party, she does not know 
she is sharing the information, or she believes that the information will be 
used in a way that respects its confidentiality.  Since the case record is 
insufficient to assess fully whether Carpenter fell in any of these categories, 
what follows is some informed guesswork. 
 From the available record, there would not seem to be any basis for 
Carpenter to claim that he was in a relationship of trust with his wireless 
carriers.  Absent some specific trust-inducing language in the carriers’ 
privacy policy, that would be a tough argument to make since trust does not 
generally seem to be an aspect of relationships with wireless carriers.  The 
specifics of the marketing materials Carpenter saw and of his interactions 
with in-store sales agents may affect the mix of facts in his favor.  These may 
 
 311 Margaret E. Twomey, Note, Voluntary Disclosure of Information as a Proposed Standard for the Fourth 
Amendment’s Third-Party Doctrine, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 401, 411 (2015) (“Patterns 
and more personal information can be identified from the combination of such extensive 
information revealing such personal details as frequently visited houses of religion, multiple trips to 
the headquarters of a political party, or regular visits to a lover’s house—information the court held 
should be protected by a warrant.” (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 
544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
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have projected the impression that the companies were to be trusted.  We do 
not have access to the nature of the marketing strategies MetroPCS and T-
Mobile used toward Carpenter, but third-party service providers frequently 
claim to respect customer privacy.312 
 The more straightforward claim for Carpenter could be that he simply 
did not know that he was sharing his location information.313  The wireless 
contracts Carpenter signed with MetroPCS and T-Mobile no doubt 
referenced their use of location information, but Carpenter may not have 
read them.  Indeed, if he had read the contracts, he would have been in the 
distinct minority of wireless subscribers.314  As it stands, there was not even 
any evidence that Carpenter was literate—in Detroit, where Carpenter’s 
exploits took place, half of adults are functionally illiterate.315   
 The Sixth Circuit’s argument was that “any cellphone user who has seen 
her phone’s signal strength fluctuate must know that . . . her phone ‘exposes’ 
its location to the nearest cell tower and thus to the company that operates 
the tower.”316  There are several gaps in that short chain of reasoning.   
• “Any user who has seen her phone’s signal fluctuate . . .”  There was no 
evidence that Carpenter did see his cell signal strength fluctuate.  
He operated in Detroit, where coverage maps for MetroPCS 
 
 312 Our Privacy Commitments, AT&T, http://about.att.com/sites/privacy_policy (last visited Mar. 8, 
2018) (“We will protect your privacy and keep your personal information safe.”); Privacy Policy 
Summary, VERIZON, http://www.verizon.com/about/privacy/privacy-policy-summary (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2018) (“At Verizon, we are committed to maintaining strong and meaningful privacy 
protections for customers.”). 
 313 A similar argument could be made under current Fourth Amendment law.  The third-party 
doctrine applies only where a person “voluntarily” shares information with third parties.  John B. 
Wefing & John G. Miles, Jr., Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Voluntariness and Third Party 
Problems, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 211, 211 (1974) (discussing the voluntariness requirement of the 
third-party doctrine).  A person who does not know she is sharing, does not do so voluntarily.  See 
C.L. Ten, Paternalism and Levels of Knowledge: A Comment on Rainbolt, 3 BIOETHICS 135, 135–36 (1989) 
(discussing how insufficient knowledge precludes voluntary decisions and actions).  But, as shown 
in the paragraphs that follow, courts applying the simplistic understanding of privacy-as-secrecy 
seem unprepared to engage in the careful factual analysis that voluntariness actually requires.  
Thinking in terms of privacy-as-confidentiality could put courts in the mindset to give the question 
the level of attention it requires. 
 314 See Caroline Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads Terms of Service Agreements, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 
15, 2017, 7:30 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/deloitte-study-91-percent-agree-terms-of-
service-without-reading-2017-11 (discussing research that ninety-one percent of people agree to 
terms of service without actually reading them). 
 315 Nearly Half of Detroit’s Adults are Functionally Illiterate, Report Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (May 7, 2011, 
12:58 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/07/detroit-illiteracy-nearly-half-
education_n_858307.html. 
 316 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
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and T-Mobile show solid blocks of strong service.317  Even if his 
signal did fluctuate between full strength and something slightly 
less, there was no evidence Carpenter would have noticed that—
the service strength symbol is small and he would likely not have 
experienced much difference in service quality. 
• “Must know that . . . her phone ‘exposes’ its location to the nearest cell 
tower.”  Even if Carpenter did notice his signal strength 
fluctuating at points, he may not have known that this was 
because cell towers were tracking his relative proximity.  It takes 
some understanding of how the cell service works to appreciate 
this fact.  While this may be obvious to the FBI agents who 
testified at Carpenter’s trial,318 most people (including the 
Author just a few years ago) use their cellphones unreflectively, 
trusting to the mysterious magic of technology.319  For all the 
signal strength icons reveal, it could be based on how well the 
phone receives a signal, not how well it is transmitting a signal; the 
former would not convey anything about location back to the 
towers.  What is more, there are many factors that can influence 
cell-signal strength even while a phone remains stationary, 
including weather conditions,320 bits of aluminum foil,321 or just 
 
 317 Coverage Map, METROPCS, https://www.metropcs.com/coverage.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2018); 
Coverage Map, T-MOBILE, https://www.t-mobile.com/coverage/coverage-map (last visited Mar. 8, 
2018). 
 318 See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 885 (discussing the trial testimony of an FBI agent who was familiar with 
cell network technology and described wireless carriers’ coverage). 
 319 See Matt Bishop, Technology, Training, and Transformation, 8 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 72, 72–73 
(2010) (discussing how most consumers have little technical understanding of cellphones and other 
modern technology).  
 320 Understanding Wireless Cellphone Coverage, FCC (Oct. 27, 2017), 
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/understanding-wireless-telephone-coverage-areas 
(“[W]ireless phone calls can be affected by severe weather . . . . ”); Duncan Graham Rowe, Mobile-
Phone Signals Reveal Rainfall: Wobbles in Transmissions Help to Create Weather Data, NATURE (May 4, 
2006), https://www.nature.com/news/2006/060501/full/news060501-10.html (“[R]ain can 
affect mobile-phone transmissions . . . .”). 
 321 Bill Robertson, Science 101: Q: Why Do You Lose AM Radio Reception When You Go Under an Overpass?, 
49 SCI. & CHILD. 67, 68 (2011) (“Just for kicks, wrap your cell phone in aluminum foil and try to 
call it.  Nada, because cell phone signals are transmitted via electromagnetic waves.”).  This fact 
has led to the rise of a niche market for “Faraday bags” for knowledgeable, privacy sensitive 
individuals who want to prevent wireless carrier snooping.  See, e.g., FARADAY BAG, 
http://faradaybag.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2018). 
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touching the wrong spot on a phone’s casing.322  None of these 
has to do with a user’s location. 
• “And thus [exposes her location] to the company that operates the tower.”  
Supposing Carpenter knew that his phone connects to the 
nearest cell towers, he still may not have known that the tower 
communicated this information in any way to his wireless 
carriers.  People interact with third-party products all the time 
even though those products convey nothing about customers to 
the companies that own them.  When someone passes through 
a third-party automatic barrier gate, the gate will not in most 
instances communicate who passed through the gate or when.  
If mounted with license plate scanners and connected to a 
network, it might, but most gates function fine without this 
hardware.  The court record did not indicate whether the cell 
towers need to communicate with MetroPCS and T-Mobile to 
function, or whether knowledge of this necessity is widespread.  
There are certainly some third-party service providers who 
claim not to access, or even to be able to access, the information 
that their customers convey using the company hardware and 
software.323  The Sixth Circuit suggested that Carpenter did not 
turn over the contents of his communications to his wireless 
carriers, even though these would have passed through the cell 
towers too.324  Why should Carpenter be presumed to know that 
his cell-site location data was any different? 
 So, again depending on the specific facts, there would have been room 
for Carpenter to argue that he had a subjective expectation of confidentiality 
over his cell-site data because he trusted his wireless carriers and/or did not 
know his phone was sending this information to them.  Carpenter could 
separately have argued that he expected them to use the information in ways 
consistent with the data’s confidentiality.  The record does not contain the 
actual service agreement that Carpenter signed with MetroPCS or T-
Mobile.  Reviewing the present privacy policies of these companies at the 
time of writing this Article is telling.  They are far from transparent.  T-
Mobile gives the initial impression that the companies make temporary use 
of location data, and only for internal purposes.  The agreement specifically 
 
 322 See Miguel Helft, On New iPhone, a Mystery of Dropped Calls, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/technology/25apple.html. 
 323 Your Benefits with Boxcryptor, BOXCRYPTOR, https://www.boxcryptor.com/en/ (last visited Nov. 2, 
2018) (offering “[z]ero knowledge encryption”). 
 324 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 885–90 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
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mentions location data: “We may use information about your location to 
provide our services or to customize data presented to you.”325  A 
straightforward reading of this phrase would suggest that these are the only 
uses to which that information would be put.326  It is only by clicking on a 
further link, and reading through blocks of longer text in much smaller font 
that one finds that T-Mobile “may disclose, without your consent, the 
approximate location of a wireless device to a governmental entity or law 
enforcement when . . . served with lawful process.”327  As Justice Gorsuch 
noted, “Consenting to give a third party access to private papers . . . is not 
the same things as consenting to a search of those papers by the government.”328  
Carpenter, had he casually read the privacy policy, could reasonably claim 
surprise that T-Mobile shared his location information with further parties 
in the absence of a warrant.   
 Similarly, he could claim surprise that T-Mobile stored and recorded his 
location data.  Using data for a limited and temporary purpose is more 
consistent with expectations of confidentiality than storing the information 
for later use.  T-Mobile’s privacy policy provides that the company “retain[s] 
information collected about [customers] for only as long as [the company] 
need[s] such information for business, legal, or tax purposes.”329  While T-
Mobile could claim to “need” Carpenter’s location data to route his calls, it 
is far from clear, and the record does not disclose, any further business, legal, 
or tax necessity for long-term records of the data.  There may have been 
some business advantage to retaining the information, but “need” conveys 
something stronger and more limited. 
 If Carpenter could have established that he had a subjective expectation 
of confidentiality, he would then have had to persuade the court that his 
expectation was reasonable.  The Sixth Circuit, thinking of privacy-as-
secrecy, seemed of the categorical opinion that Carpenter’s “conduct was not 
and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy” of his location.330  
The analysis in terms of confidentiality would be much more nuanced.  As 
in the privilege context, the court would have to balance factual 
 
 325 T-Mobile Privacy Statement Highlights, T-MOBILE (Dec. 31, 2016), https://www.t-
mobile.com/company/website/privacypolicy.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/8KQQ-F9YY]. 
 326 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 107 (2012) (explaining the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which stands for the idea 
that an affirmative statement makes a negative implication of its contrapositive). 
 327 T-Mobile Privacy Statement Highlights, supra note 325. 
 328 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2263 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 329 T-Mobile Privacy Statement Highlights, supra note 325 (emphasis added). 
 330 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
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circumstances that potentially undermine confidentiality with steps 
Carpenter took to preserve it.  The main fact that Carpenter would have had 
to overcome to establish the reasonableness of his expectation is his formal 
agreement to his wireless carriers’ privacy policies.  These no doubt reflected 
that the companies would collect, could share, and might store his location 
information.  In the absence of taking any steps to preserve confidentiality, 
this may be enough to defeat the reasonableness of Carpenter’s expectation.  
Importantly, though, there are steps Carpenter could have taken to preserve 
his reasonable expectation of confidentiality. 
 The record does not reflect any precautionary steps Carpenter took.  
Under present understandings of the third-party doctrine, this is 
unsurprising—such details would not have been relevant anyway.  The case 
law on privilege suggests several steps that could have been relevant: 
• Turning off his phone except when needed.  This would have 
prevented his phone from “pinging” nearby towers when it was 
not in use. 
• Using a Faraday bag.  This would have had the same effect as 
turning off his phone by cutting any communication between 
the phone and cell towers. 
• Turning off his GPS.  Cell-site location data is much less 
accurate than GPS.331 
• Leaving his phone at home when possible. 
• Password protecting his phone.  This would have secured any 
location data stored on his phone from third parties who might 
try to access it. 
• Using multiple phones and wireless carriers.  This would have 
prevented any single source from having a consistent record of 
his location data. 
• Using a location spoofer.  These are apps that can scramble a 
phone’s GPS location.332 
• Updating phone and app settings so they did not store location 
records. 
 Of course, none of these steps, alone or in combination, could have 
guaranteed that Carpenter’s location data would have remained confidential.  
That is not the question.333  Rather, the courts should be asking whether, 
 
 331 See id. at 889 (discussing that, while GPS devices can be accurate within fifty feet, cell-site location merely 
identifies a wedge that ranges between one-half mile and two miles across that a cellphone is in). 
 332 See Nathan J.  Buchok, Plotting a Course for GPS Evidence, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1019, 1031 (2010) 
(discussing how a “spoofer” is able to deceive a GPS device about the spoofer’s location). 
 333 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2263 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[K]nowing about a risk doesn’t mean you 
assume responsibility for it.”). 
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given the necessity of cell phones to modern life, the way cell phones work, 
and the details of the privacy policy Carpenter signed, any steps he did take 
were reasonably calculated to justify an expectation of confidentiality.  Just 
as courts assessing privilege find that there are steps employees can take to 
justify reasonable expectations of confidentiality in emails they send from 
employer monitored devices, there will be some steps that in combination 
could suffice in Carpenter’s circumstances.   
CONCLUSION 
 This Article proposes replacing the Supreme Court’s current 
understanding of Fourth Amendment privacy.  The concept usually goes 
undefined in the case law.  The Court’s development of the third-party 
doctrine—that privacy is generally lost when information is shared with third 
parties—reveals that its implicit understanding of privacy is as a type of 
secrecy.  Thinking of privacy as secrecy is too restrictive in the modern world, 
where we must rely on third parties for our ordinary social and economic 
lives.  A different area of privacy law—attorney-client privilege—is more 
adaptable and has already responded to the current state of technology.  In 
privilege law, the relevant notion is privacy as a sort of confidentiality.  Unlike 
secrets, confidential information can be shared with third parties, and still 
remain confidential with the right precautions. 
 If the Court drew on the developed common law of privacy-as-
confidentiality, it would have the tools to respect the Fourth Amendment 
interests people have in personal communications that require the assistance 
of third-party service providers.  When determining whether a person has a 
reasonable expectation of confidentiality in information shared with third-
party service providers, a court’s central questions would be: 
1. Did the person have a subjective expectation that the third-party 
service provider would keep the information confidential? 
2. Was that expectation reasonable?  That is to say, in light of the 
circumstances, did the person take appropriate steps to preserve the 
confidentiality of the information? 
Both of these questions call for case-specific inquiries, balancing features of 
the circumstance that may have called for caution, and the cautious steps 
taken in response.  Courts assessing claims of attorney-client privilege have 
been answering these questions for cell phones, text messages, emails, and 
the like for decades.  Their collective wisdom would be a powerful resource 
for courts assessing confidentiality in the context of the Fourth Amendment 
in the modern age.  
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 As with any standard, the fact-specific balancing required to assess 
reasonable expectations of confidentiality will introduce some measure of 
unpredictability into the process.334  This is undeniably a cost for suspects, 
judicial administration, and police departments trying to ascertain whether 
a search requires a warrant.335  It is a cost that pervades much of the Fourth 
Amendment privacy analysis.336  The present proposal would extend this 
uncertainty to the present predictability of third party cases.  This a systemic 
issue that courts evaluating searches have to grapple with.  At least so far as 
the present proposal is concerned, there some reason for relative optimism.  
Courts have a very long history and a good track record of assessing 
reasonable expectations of confidentiality in the privilege context.  This long-
standing jurisprudcence would be an aid to suspects, courts, and police 
navigating the early stages of Fourth Amendment confidentiality 
jurisprudence.  Enforcement authorities with sufficiently well-founded 
suspicions can always secure a warrant and the assurances it brings.   
 These uncertainty costs of moving from privacy-as-secrecy to privacy-as-
confidentiality should not be trivialized.  However, where the options are 
between a rule that systematically undermines Fourth Amendment interests 
and a less efficient standard that has a chance of protecting them, the costs 
are easier to justify.  Marginal inefficiencies in the courtroom and the police 
station are a small cost to pay for guarding our basic civil liberties.  This is 
what thinking of privacy as confidentiality promises to do. 
 
 
 334 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).  
 335 See Kerr, supra note 22, at 583–84. 
 336 See Christie v. Borough of Folcroft, No. Civ.A. 04-5944, 2005 WL 2396762, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
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